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Abstract: The rise of supermarkets in Kenya has given rise to a new group of medium-sized farms 
managed by well-educated farmers. Focusing on kale, the essay shows that nearly all supermarket-
channel farmers have the capacity to supply larger volumes year round and have transportation vehicles, 
an irrigation system, a packing shed, a cellular phone, and so on, pointing to the existence of a threshold 
capital vector which farmers must have in order to access supermarkets. Especially farm size and 
irrigation were found to be significant determinants of participation in the supermarket channel. Kale 
suppliers to supermarkets use more capital intensive production technologies, leading to average labor 
and land productivities which are 60-70% higher than in the traditional channel. Eighty percent of labor 
consists of hired workers, indicating that these farmers could be important in alleviating poverty for rural 
households with little or no land. While most traditional-channel kale farmers sell to brokers and get a 
price that lets them break-even at best, supermarket-channel farmers have a 40% gross profit margin. 
These margins and lower market risks in the supermarket channel have resulted in a strong growth 
dynamic of supermarket-channel farmers which have doubled the size of their operations over the last 
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FARM-LEVEL PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC SUPERMARKETS 





The rise of supermarkets in developing countries has received considerable attention in the 
development economics literature over the last few years (Reardon and Berdegue 2002, 
Weatherspoon and Reardon 2003, Hu et al. 2004). The research presented in those articles 
mostly focused on the retailer-level, revealing that supermarkets are (i) growing fast, (ii) 
becoming important, even dominant agents in the food supply chain and (iii) implementing very 
different procurement systems than those observed in the traditional food marketing system. In 
Kenya for example, Neven and Reardon 2004 showed that supermarkets are growing at an 
annual rate of 18%, had a 20% share of the urban food market in 2003 and are rapidly 
developing the various pillars of the new procurement system (i.e., centralization, 
regionalization, preferred suppliers, specialized wholesalers, private standards and grades). 
While indicating a likely differential impact of this more demanding procurement system on 
farmer participation in the supermarket channel, the analyses in this first wave of research on 
supermarkets in developing countries was for the greater part limited in its scope to data from 
retailers and wholesalers. Based on farmer surveys in the fresh fruits and vegetables (FFV) sub-
sector, this essay aims to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing the rise of supermarkets in 
Kenya from the farmer perspective. 
The strategic objective of this essay is to assess the effect of the development of the 
supermarket sector in Kenya on FFV producers’ behavior and net incomes. Controlling for 
product we have the following three research questions:  
 
(1) What are the determinants of the farmers’ channel choice (supermarket channel vs. the 
traditional channel)? 
 
(2) What are the effects of participation in the supermarket channel on the farmer’s 
production technology? 
 
(3) What are the effects of participation in the supermarket channel on the farmer’s net 
income? 
 
The research presented here focuses on kale
1 growers, although some limited analyses for 
tomatoes and bananas is included to get a broader perspective. These products were chosen (i) 
because of their importance in terms of volume in Kenya’s produce sub-sector and (ii) because 
they represent different risk-return trade-offs. Kale is a labor-intensive crop (requiring intensive 
weeding) with a reliable yield (relative to agro-ecological conditions), but a generally low market 
                                                 
1 Kale, a leafy green vegetable (member of the cabbage family) is the most widely grown and consumed vegetable 
in Kenya. Its low price and high nutritional value make it especially important in the diet of the poor who consume it 
with the local (maize-flour-based) staple ugali (hence its local name sukuma wiki, Swahili for ‘push the week’). In 
2002, overall kale production in Kenya reached 317,000MT with an estimated rural market value of Ksh2 billion, 
i.e., 30% of the total volume and 17% of the total value of vegetable production respectively (MoARD 2002).  
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price, making it well-suited for risk-averse smallholder farmers who have a high labor-to-capital 
ratio. Tomatoes are more capital intensive (requiring irrigation for water control, more chemicals 
to control diseases, more expensive good quality seeds, and so on) and their yield is more 
variable, but prices are generally higher, thus attracting farmers with more capital, who can 
afford to take greater yield risks in return for higher potential returns. In banana production, 
access to planting materials (e.g., tissue culture) is a critical issue as demand for these materials 
outstrips supply (MoARD 2000), so that less mobile and less informed smallholder farmers have 
less access to it. 
The essay is structured as follows. The next section briefly lays out the conceptual 
approach to the research questions. Section 3 indicates how supermarket-channel farmers and 
traditional-channel farmers were defined in this study and describes the data that were collected. 
Section 4 compares the characteristics, the production practices and the marketing practices of 
farmers directly supplying supermarkets and farmers supplying the traditional system of brokers 
and wholesalers. Section 5 uses the case of the kale supply chain to assess the determinants of 
channel participation (supermarket channel vs. traditional channel) and analyzes the production 
technology and net income effects of this participation. Section 6 concludes and provides 
recommendations for development policy and programs. 
 
2. Conceptual Approach 
 
The rise of supermarkets in Kenya is here modeled as a shock to a domestic FFV supply system 
that has shown few dynamics over the last few decades, apart from a steady growth in volumes 
and in the number of rural producers in response to urbanization (Dijkstra 1999a). On the one 
hand, supermarkets may pay higher prices to farmers and/or may offer them more demand 
reliability both in terms of price and volume. On the other hand, meeting the supermarket’s 
higher standards for food safety and quality and other delivery conditions  may imply the 
presence of (or additional investments in) certain production and marketing capital as well as an 
increased need for working capital to deal for example with higher input use and buyer credit. In 
other words, the rise of supermarkets in Kenya is hypothesized to contribute to an 
industrialization of the food system as observed in other countries (Reardon and Barrett 2000). 
Here we shall take an essentially micro-economic approach, focusing on how this shock impacts 
the behavior of FFV producers as individual agents. 
First, we model the farmer’s decision on whether or not to sell to supermarkets as a 
standard static adoption decision, where the adoption of X (in this case the supermarket channel) 
is determined by the incentives for and capacities of farmers (Feder et al. 1985). The different 
requirements of supermarkets are hypothesized to determine a K* vector of threshold capital 
requirements, embodying a technology, which suppliers must have before the supermarket 
channel enters their opportunity set. Different technologies as embodied in different capital 
vectors (e.g., a labor intensive K1* and capital intensive K2*) may exist, with both giving farmers 
the capacity to meet the supermarkets’ requirements. Furthermore, K* may only be weakly 
enforced by supermarkets and will likely be a moving target for farmers (supermarket 
requirements become more stringent over time). K* may include physical capital (e.g., land, 
vehicles), human capital (e.g., business experience), financial capital (e.g., cash reserves) and 
organizational capital (e.g., group membership). Farmers with a capital vector K>K* are 
expected to enter the supermarket channel if the incentives are there. Farmers with K<K* are 
excluded from the supermarket channel. The latter may be undesirable from a social welfare  
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point of view, if the supermarket channel represents higher net incomes for farmers and if the 
smallholder farmers who make up the bulk of Kenya’s population are being excluded from it. 
Our conceptual model then takes on the following general reduced form (i.e., the input demand 
function as derived from the farmer’s profit function; Sadoulet and De Janvry, 1995):  
 
channel choice = f(p, r, σ, k, z), 
 
where p, r, σ, k and z represent output prices, input prices, risk factors, quasi-fixed capital and 
shifters respectively. Output prices, input prices and risk factors (including transaction costs) are 
in part implicit to the channel choice (which determines governance structure) and are further 
determined by farm characteristics such as its location and size. Therefore input and output 
prices and risk factors will not be directly entered in the implementation model (section 5.1). 
Given the limited geographic spread of the sample populations (see next section) and thus too 
limited variation across the sample for this variable, location as a key shifter will also be 
excluded. This implies that our channel choice model will mainly be determined by quasi-fixed 
capital. The latter both represents resources internal to the farm and at the same time co-
determines access to external resources. For example, size of the land owned by the farmers is a 
direct resource as well as an indicator of access to credit (Carter and Wiebe 1990). 
  Second, we assess the differential effect of channel choice on production technology by 
comparing the production functions for farmers supplying supermarkets and farmers supplying 
traditional marketing channel agents. The distribution of the farmers over these two groups is not 
random but rather the outcome of a self-selection process and this non-randomness may bias the 
estimated coefficients in the production function. In order to control for this selectivity bias, we 
use Heckit’s two-stage method (Heckman 1979). In the first stage, a probit model is used to 
estimate the selection model, i.e., channel choice regressed on a set of exogenous determinants 
using the whole sample. From this estimation, the inverse Mill’s ratio (λ) is calculated based on 
the residuals of the selection equation. This ratio represents a summarizing measure which 
reflects the effects of all the unmeasured characteristics which are related to channel choice 
(Smits 2003). In the second stage of the Heckman procedure, we estimate the production 
function (the substantial model which is the real focus here) for both sub-populations while 
adding the lambda variable as an explanatory variable to control for self-selection bias.  
Third, we assess the net income effect of channel choice using gross margin analysis. We 
then place this net income effect in the broader context of value chain theory (Kaplinsky and 
Morris 2001). According to value chain theory, the following dynamic models the growth 
process of a firm: (1) the performance of firm A depends on the performance of  A’s network 
partners and vice versa (systemic efficiency);  (2) the participation of A in a supply chain takes 
on a particular governance structure (system access) depending on A’s performance, the policies 
of the government and the channel captain of A’s supply chain and the location and network 
relationships of A; (3) the benefits accruing to A depend on the governance structure for A, the 
performance of A and A’s market power (distributional effects); (4) the amount of benefits 
accruing then determine the degree of upgrading, which in turn affects the performance of A 
(coming full circle: system dynamics). We will assess this model by comparing (income and risk 
related) benefits accruing to farmers, governance structures and upgrading/growth in the 








The central objective of this essay is to better understand the nature and behavior of the FFV 
farmers who are supplying supermarkets in Kenya. There are basically three types of FFV 
suppliers to supermarkets (Neven and Reardon 2004): importers (14% of supplies), brokers or 
other middlemen relying mostly on smallholder producers (43% of supplies) and farmers 
supplying direct to the supermarket (43% of supplies). Of the latter, 23% come from small farms 
(<10 acres), 42% come from medium-sized farms (10-40 acres) and 35% come from large 
farms/plantations (>40 acres). Farmers as direct suppliers of FFV can further be classified into 
listed and unlisted suppliers, i.e., based on whether or not they are part of the list of regular FFV 
suppliers to the supermarkets. In 2003, 125 out of an estimated 400 direct FFV suppliers to the 
leading two chains were listed, with the non-listed suppliers mainly consisting of smallholder 
farmers and brokers ad hoc addressing shortages not yet resolved by listed suppliers (according 
to our interviews with the supermarkets). In this context, the target population is here defined as 
‘the farmers listed as direct FFV suppliers to Uchumi and Nakumatt supermarkets’. This 
population was selected for the following four reasons. First, within the next five years, 85-90% 
of the locally sourced FFV sold in supermarkets are expected to be supplied directly by farmers 
(or farmer groups), as opposed to through traditional brokers (in 2003, 50% was directly supplied 
by farmers; Neven and Reardon 2004) Second, as supermarkets develop their FFV procurement 
system these direct supplies will come from listed suppliers only. Third, farmers supplying 
supermarkets indirectly through traditional brokers feel no impact from supermarkets because 
the brokers’ buying behavior is not different, as these are, again according to our interviews with 
the supermarkets, the same brokers supplying wholesale markets in Nairobi (i.e., they are not 
specialized brokers working with the same group of farmers over time). Fourth, 90% of FFV 
sold through supermarkets are sold through the two leading chains, Uchumi and Nakumatt 
(Neven and Reardon 2004). We shall further refer to this population of ‘farmers listed as direct 
FFV suppliers to Uchumi and Nakumatt’ as ‘supermarket-channel farmers’. 
In order to assess to what extent these supermarket-channel farmers are different from 
farmers supplying through the traditional FFV system, a similar data set was also collected on 
farmers who supply directly to traditional marketing agents (brokers, wholesalers, open air 
markets), but not to supermarkets. Since this is a large and heterogeneous population, we focused 
on farmers in selected key production regions for selected produce items bound for the Nairobi 
market. The selected products are kale, tomato and banana, which are in terms of volume the two 
most important vegetables and the most important fruit in the domestic market. The production 
areas for these products were selected based on their relative importance as indicated in 
interviews with operators at Nairobi’s key FFV wholesale markets (Wakulima, Gikomba, 
Kawangare, Kangemi). We shall further refer to this population as ‘traditional-channel farmers’.  
Two farmer surveys were conducted. The first farmer survey took place in the period 
September-November, 2003 and focused on the capacities of the farmers and the marketing 
methods they used. A total of 115 farmers were interviewed, comprising two sub-samples. The 
first sub-sample consists of 49 supermarket-channel farmers randomly selected from the supplier 
lists provided by Uchumi and Mugoya, the (then) specialized FFV wholesaler of Nakumatt 
(these 49 farmers equal 40% of the listed FFV suppliers). One of the requirements for being a 
listed supermarket-channel farmer is that the farmer can easily be reached by phone. Thanks to  
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the emergence and rapid diffusion of cellular phones in Kenya, many farmers, not just the rich 
ones, have (access to) a phone (e.g., 30% of the traditional-channel farmers in our research could 
be reached by cellular phone). This allowed us to contact the supermarket-channel farmers by 
phone to set up a time and place to meet for the interview. If a farmer could not be reached or 
refused to participate, he or she was replaced by the next farmer on the list (which consists 
almost exclusively of individual farmers). The interviews usually took place on the farm, but on 
occasion at a supermarket after delivery or at an in-town office (as we shall discuss in more 
detail in section 4.3, quite a few of the key supermarket-channel farms started out as “hobby-
farms” of those with well-paying formal jobs in Nairobi who turned commercial in response to 
the rise of supermarkets). Most of these farmers produced a wide variety of FFV items (most of 
them marketed to the supermarkets) but each farmer was interviewed in detail only for her or his 
highest volume produce item
2. In terms of location, around 80% of the supermarket-channel 
farms were located in favorable FFV zones within a 100km radius around Nairobi (mostly in the 
highlands north and north-west of the capital), the same zones where most of the traditional-
channel farmers are located. The other 20% were located either farther from Nairobi or in the 
less fertile rural areas south-east of Nairobi (which have the advantage of lower prices and 
greater expansion possibilities due to the far lower population density). The average distance 
from the farm to Nairobi is 72km (i.e., closer than the traditional channel farmers in this study). 
For this sample we found that 25% of them are small farms (<10 acres), 43% are medium-sized 
farms (between 10 and 40 acres), 18% are large farms (between 40 and 200 acres) and 14% are 
plantations (>200 acre). This closely matches the distribution of the FFV supplies over different 
sizes as given by the supermarkets. 
The second sub-sample consists of 66 traditional-channel farmers (22 kale growers, 22 
tomato growers, 22 banana growers), all of them located in zones which are well-suited for these 
crops and which are key production zones for the Nairobi-bound supplies of these produce 
items
3. In terms of distance, these farms are located farther away from Nairobi than the 
supermarket-channel farmers (less than 70% are within a 100km radius around Nairobi, while 
the average distance to Nairobi is 122km). With no crop specific population frameworks 
available, farmers were selected (within a division) based on a judgment sample with the 
assistance of local traders and/or the division’s horticultural development officer. The latter were 
asked to select a sample that was in terms of farm size representative for the division. The 
average farm size for the traditional-channel farms in our sample is 5.2 acres, which is similar to 
the average farm size indicated in other reports as varying from 3 to 7 acres depending on the 
specific location (e.g., Dijkstra 1992, Ministry of Agriculture 2003, 2004). Of the traditional-
channel farmers sampled in this survey, 85% were smallholders and 15% were medium-sized. 
The second farmer survey (August 2004) focused on technology choices and net income 
effects. For this survey we focused on kale only. Kale was selected because it is a produce item 
for which there is a sufficiently large group of suppliers to supermarkets and for which 
supermarkets have developed their supply system the most with nearly all of the kale being 
supplied directly to the supermarket by listed farmers (and thus providing an interesting case-
                                                 
2 These items are: kale (12 growers), tomato (5 growers), banana (5 growers), spinach (12 growers), papaya (3 
growers), lettuce (2 growers), cabbage (2 growers), pineapple (2 growers), and broccoli, mangoes, capsicum, black 
nightshade (mnavu), French beans and potatoes (1 grower each). In the comparative part of our analysis we focused 
on the 5 tomato, 12 kale and 5 banana growers in this sample. 
3The selected districts were Kirinyaga (22 farmers) for tomatoes, Kiambu (12 farmers), Thika (6 farmers) and 
Nyandarua (4 farmers) for kale and Meru (14 farmers) and Muranga (8 farmers) for bananas.   
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study of the farm-level impact of supermarkets). A total of 51 farmers were interviewed in this 
survey, again comprising of two sub-samples. In the first sub-sample, we selected 14 out of 30 
listed farmers supplying kale to Uchumi and/or Nakumatt (this sample thus represents roughly 
half of the kale suppliers to these chains). Of these farms, about 60% were located in the same 
key production area from where we selected the traditional-channel sample (i.e., Kiambu district, 
well-suited for growing kale in terms of agro-ecological conditions and, because of its proximity 
to Nairobi, well-suited for marketing the highly perishable kale). The other 40% were located in 
the less fertile (peri-urban) zones south-east of Nairobi, where as mentioned above, land is more 
available and thus less expensive. The average (total) farm size in this sub-sample is 31 acres and 
the average distance to Nairobi is 36km (i.e., ten times the size of the traditional-channel farmers 
described in the next paragraph and located slightly closer to the capital). 
To have a comparable sample (second sub-sample), we then interviewed 37 traditional-
channel farmers located in two divisions which were identified as key kale production areas for 
the Nairobi market (Lari and Limuru divisions in Kiambu district). Kale growers in these two 
divisions represent a production volume that is 50% of the estimated consumption in Nairobi. 
The average distance to the market is, as in the first farmer survey, greater for traditional-channel 
farmers than for supermarket-channel farmers (49km vs. 36km). As in the 2003 survey, farmers 
were selected based on a judgment sample with the assistance of divisional horticultural 
development officers. The average farm size of the traditional-channel farmers in this sample is 3 





In addition to the two farmer surveys, additional semi-structured interviews were conducted to 
get a better understanding of various aspects of the domestic FFV system in Kenya. These 
included interviews with: (1) selected input suppliers to obtain cost data on certain inputs; (2) 
key experts on the different technology options; and (3) the successive intermediaries 
downstream from farmer to retailer in the traditional FFV market channel. 
 
4. The Nature of Supermarket-Channel Farmers 
 
4.1 Supermarket-Channel Farmers Compared to Traditional-Channel Farmers 
 
In this section we will compare supermarket-channel farmers and traditional-channel farmers 
with respect to a set of key characteristics for the three selected products: tomato, kale and 
banana. The data indicate that there are substantial differences between supermarket-channel and 
traditional-channel farmers in terms of landholdings, labor use, gender, human capital, physical 
capital, diversification, organization capital and marketing practices. In this section we shall 
discuss only the findings where the significance of the difference is at the 10% level or higher. 
 
Land Related Differences 
 
Supermarket-channel farms are on average much larger, in overall farm size, than traditional 
farms (Table 1). This holds across the three products, but is especially stark for the kale farmers 
where the ratio between the two sizes is 12 to 1. One reason for this may be that kale is a less  
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risky crop than tomatoes (requiring fewer inputs, less capital) and therefore involves more 
smallholder farmers in the traditional channel thus reducing the average overall farm size in this 
group. Not only is the overall farm size, but also the land devoted to the specific crop (tomato, 
kale or banana) is greater for the supermarket-channel farmers. The main reason is that given 
their higher land availability supermarket-channel farmers will optimize by bringing an area 
under cultivation that is in line with the size of the orders they get from the supermarkets, taking 
into account that for a year-round delivery (as preferred by the supermarkets) several plots of the 
produce item in various successive stages of the harvest cycle are required. By contrast, the 
traditional-channel farmers use part of the farm size for food-crop production (beans, maize), for 
dairy, for their home-stead, and so on, leaving only small plots (relative to the supermarket-
channel farmers) for FFV production, even if these plots represent a large portion of the farm 
size (e.g., for kale on average nearly 25% of the overall farm-size, compared to only 7% for 
supermarket-channel farmers). 
Other patterns, related to technology and land-use, which hold across the three selected 
products are that supermarket-channel farmers have less of their land under cultivation (e.g., in 
the case of kale 71% versus 87% for traditional-channel farmers), but have a larger percentage of 
it under irrigation. Both patterns are related to the need to supply supermarkets on a regular basis 
throughout the year. Fallow periods, as a part of crop rotation cycles, are facilitated when farms 
are large and enough land is available to take the place of the land under fallow. Another reason 
for the higher percentage of the land not farmed is that supermarket-channel farmers have bought 
land for future expansion as they are growing fast (see section 5.5). Irrigation is a condition sine 
qua non for regular year-round supply and the most critical requirement demanded by 
supermarkets (Neven and Reardon 2004). Again, the difference is most pronounced for the kale 
farmers (75% of the farm size is irrigated for supermarket-channel farmers versus only 18% for 
traditional-channel farmers). As before, this results from the large number of small farms which 
have specialized in kale and which do not have the capital to invest in irrigation systems. 
With regard to landownership, clear distinctions emerge across the products. Amongst 
kale growers, supermarket-channel farmers basically own all of their land while only two thirds 
of the farm land of the traditional-channel farmers is owned by them. This is mainly because of 
land provided for free by parents to their children in the selected divisions for kale (relatively 
densely populated areas with limited opportunities to buy or rent land). Supermarket-channel 
farmers who supply tomatoes on the other hand opt mostly for leased land relative to their 
traditional competitors. One reason is that the tomato growing regions selected in this study have 
a relatively dense network of rivers so that there is no need to install boreholes and neither are 
other permanent structures (e.g., greenhouses) used for tomato growing. The presence of such 
fixed capital assets would create an incentive to buy rather then lease land in order to secure 
them. For banana growers there is no significant difference in landownership (as a percentage of 
the farm size) between supermarket-channel farmers and traditional-channel farmers. The 
observation that many coffee growers shifted to banana growing after sustained periods of 
depressed coffee prices (MoARD 2002) and the more long-term nature of the cultivation of 
bananas are two likely determinants of relatively high degrees of land-ownership for both groups 
of farmers (nature of crop provides incentive to secure investment through land-ownership). 
Specialization in horticulture (as a percentage of the farmed land) appears to be slightly higher 
for supermarket-channel farmers, except for kale. We further found a negative correlation 
between land ownership and specialization in horticulture (significant at the 1% level), indicating 
that leased land is used more intensively for FFV. This may be the result of leased land being  
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leased for a particular purpose (e.g., to grow only tomatoes) and for a particular time period, 
potentially short enough not to care too much about depleting the soil because of intensive 
cultivation of one particular crop (another, more fertile piece of land may be leased for the next 
cycle). It can further be expected that a resource (like leased land) with a specific use limitation 
(duration of the lease) and explicit cost (rent payment) provides more of an incentive to get the 
highest possible return from it.  
 
Table 1: Land Related Differences (supermarket- vs. traditional-channel farmers) 





















farm size (acres)  6.1    *  23.0    *  3.8     *  45.6   *  5.8  34.0 
land owned (% of farm size)  60     *  20       *  66  ***  99  ***  87  80 
land irrigated (% of farm size)  93   **  100   **  18  ***  75  ***  41  66 
land farmed (% of farm size)  89  80  87      *  71      *  93  88 
land used for horticulture (% of 
land farmed) 
90  ***  100  ***  83 65 52  66 
Land used for crop (acres)  2.5  4.5  0.9     *  3.4     *  1.5   *  9.3   * 
Notes: *=significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
Source: authors’ farmer survey 2003.  
 
Labor, Gender and Human Capital Differences 
As expected given the difference in farm size, supermarket-channel farmers have more 
permanent employees and more casual workers than traditional-channel farmers (Table 2). The 
average labor-to-land ratio (number of permanent farm workers per acre of farmed land for the 
whole farm, not just the specific crop) is lower for supermarket-channel farmers than for 
traditional-channel farmers, mainly due to a heavy reliance on abundantly available family labor 
amongst the latter.  For example in the case of kale, 79% of the permanent farm workers on 
traditional-channel farms are family members, while for supermarket-channel farms 79% of the 
permanent farm workers are hired employees. This pattern also holds at the aggregated level 
(i.e., sum of all farm workers over sum of all farm sizes for each product-farmer type 
combination), although the difference become less stark because the larger traditional-channel 
farmers are less labor intensive. The aggregated numbers imply that the size of the farm is taken 
into account and we found that labor-to-land ratio and size (measured as land farmed for all 
products) are negatively correlated for traditional-channel farms (significant at the 1% level). For 
example, kale farms (in the traditional channel) below five acres have a labor-to-land ratio of 1.9, 
while farms above five acres have a labor-to-land ratio of 0.9. The high number of hired 
permanent and casual workers on farms in the supermarket channel implies that supermarket-
channel farmers are (in absolute numbers) important providers of job opportunities for rural 
households with little or no land. For permanent employees, this also holds in relative (labor per 
acre) terms. In the case of kale growers for example, the average farm-level number of 
permanent hired workers per acre of farmed land (across all products, not just kale) is 0.9 for the 
supermarket-channel farmers and only 0.5 for the traditional-channel farmers. However, the 
opposite holds for casual workers: for kale growers, for example, the average number of casual 
workers per acre of farmed land is 2.1 for the supermarket-channel farmers and 1.3 for the 
traditional-channel farmers. However, the comparison is less straight forward as the actual labor  
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time for which casual workers are hired is difficult to estimate (it was not estimated in this study 
which merely asked farmers to indicate the number of casuals hired during peak times). 
 
Table 2: Labor, Human Capital and Gender Differences (superm. vs. trad. channel ) 





















permanent employees(#/farm)  4  19  3       **  33   **  3  8 
casual labor  (#/farm)  10 **  17   **  4         *  19     *  4     ***  11 *** 
family labor (% of permanent empl.)  47 ***  3     ***  79   ***  21 ***  74   ***  11 *** 
labor-to-land  ratio  (farm  level)  1.4  0.9 1.6 1.1  1.1 0.5 
labor-to-land  ratio  (aggregate)  0.9  0.9 1.1 0.9  0.6 0.4 
schooling farm head (yrs)  9   **  13   **  7     ***  13 ***  7     ***  15 *** 
age  farm  head  (yrs)  35  38 40 47  53 46 
years in farming farm head  10.6  9.4  12.9  13.4  21.2  **  9.6  ** 
female labor (% of empl., farm level)  24  41  54    **  39   **  47  20 
female labor (% of empl,, aggregate)  22  59  51  34  36  10 
female  headed  farms  (%)  5 20 32 17  27 20 
Notes: *=significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
Source: authors’ farmer survey 2003.  
 
The age of farmers does not appear to be different between the two groups of farmers, and except 
for banana growers (some of whom have been in farming since the 1930s and 1940s), the same 
can be said about the years of farming experience the farmers have. There is however a very 
clear pattern regarding the education of the farmers: traditional-channel farmers on average have 
a primary education, while supermarket-channel farmers on average have a secondary education. 
This can be explained mostly by the observation that many of the supermarket-channel farmers 
had (or still have) formal jobs in the private or public sector and started out as hobby-farmers 
(see section 4.2 for more detail). Hence higher education gave access to formal, well-paying 
jobs, from there to savings invested in farms and from there to supermarket channel 
participation. 
The survey also allows us to make some observations regarding farm-level gender-related 
aspects of the impact of the rise of supermarkets in the domestic FFV supply channel.  First, for 
kale and banana there appear to be fewer farms headed by women amongst the supermarket-
channel farmers while the opposite appears to hold for tomato, although no statistical differences 
could be found. Second, the average percentage of full-time employees who are women is 
significantly lower for kale supermarket-channel farmers than for kale farmers in the traditional 
channel. Within the limitations of the data set, this pattern does not hold across all produce items 
as tomato supermarket-channel farmers appear to hire more women than their traditional 
competitors do. 
 
Physical Capital Differences   
 
Table 3 paints a stark picture regarding the diffusion of physical capital in the two farmer groups. 
When we look at the kale farmers, we see that all of the supermarket-channel farmers have a 
phone and their own (motorized) means of transportation, and that a large percentage have an 
advanced irrigation system (i.e., drip or sprinkler), a packing shed and electricity at the farm  
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(either through a generator or from the grid). By contrast, significantly less of the traditional-
channel farmers use these technologies, with (cellular) phones having reached the highest degree 
of diffusion amongst traditional-channel farmers (3 out of 10 traditional-channel farmers have 
(access to) a cellular phone). Other technologies such as greenhouses, shadow netting and cold 
rooms were encountered, but only at very few farms, all of which are supermarket-channel 
farmers. The latter is related more to the nature of these farms than that this has resulted from the 
requirements of the supermarkets. For example, some of the supermarket-channel farmers (about 
10%) also supply (different produce items) for the export market and have set up cold chain 
technologies for this. This implies that these farmers have an advantage if and when domestic 
supermarkets would start requiring cold chain technology from their produce suppliers. 
While the small numbers of supermarket-channel farmers for tomato and banana does not 
allow meaningful chi-square tests, it appears this wide divide in technology use between 
supermarket-channel farmers and traditional-channel farmers also holds for these two produce 
items. The relatively high percentages of traditional-channel farmers using irrigation for 
tomatoes and bananas results from tomatoes needing at least furrow irrigation and one of the 
selected banana growing areas having a government installed irrigation infrastructure (main 
line). 
The high rate of technology diffusion amongst the supermarket-channel farmers (close to 100%) 
indicates that there probably is a threshold level capital vector (K*) which farmers must have in 
order to access the supermarket channel. Supermarkets indicated to us that they select their FFV 
suppliers on the basis of their ability to become reliable suppliers over the long term. This means 
that these farms must demonstrate their ability to produce year-round (presence of irrigation 
system and year round source of clean water) and to deliver with short lead times (presence of 
phone, transportation, packing shed). The presence of these technologies is at present a very 
strong but not yet strict requirement (not all these technologies have a diffusion rate of 100% for 
all produce items), mainly because the FFV procurement system of the supermarkets is still in an 
early, formative stage. A strict implementation of these physical capital requirements is likely for 
the near future. 
 
Table 3: Physical Capital Differences (Supermarket vs. Traditional-channel farmers) 





















farms with phone (%)  29  100  31   ***  100 ***  24  100 
farms with irrigation system (%)  100  100  27   ***  92   ***  55  100 
farms with drip/overhead irrig. (%)  5  40  18   ***  92   ***  32  40 
farms with transp. vehicles (%)  14  80  9     ***  100 ***  5  80 
farms with a packing shed (%)  0  80  0     ***  75   ***  0  40 
farms with electricity (%)  0  20  5     ***  83   ***  5  20 
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level. 





Differences in Diversification, Organizational Capital and Marketing Practices  
  11
 
Table 4 compares supermarket-channel farmers and traditional-channel farmers over a broad set 
of farm characteristics. In terms of diversification, two observations can be made. First, we found 
no statistically significant difference in the percentage of overall income coming from farming. 
Across the three products and two channels, farming is, on average, the main source of income. 
Second, farmers growing tomatoes and kale for supermarkets grow more than twice as many 
different horticultural crops and are therefore far less dependent on the production and market 
risks of any particular crop. This is in part the result of the greater availability of land for 
supermarket-channel farmers. 
 
Table 4: Differences in Diversification, Organizational Capital and Marketing Practices 
(Supermarket vs. Traditional-channel farmers) 





















% of hh income from farming  87  82  81  60  87  60 
# of different horticultural 
products grown (at a given time) 
2      *  5      *  3     ***  7     ***  3  2 
farms collaborating with other 
farms (%) 
46 0  32 33 29  80 
farms member of coop/assoc. (%)  18  0  73   ***  8     ***  77  0 
farms with livestock (%)  41  0  68  92  96  60 
output marketed of crop (%)  84   ***  99   ***  72   ***  96   ***  74 ***  100 *** 
farms keeping farm records (%)  64  80  33   ***  92   ***  18  100 
farms transporting to buyer (%)  23  100  9     ***  100 ***  14  100 
farms getting phone-orders (%)  0  80  5     ***  100 ***  0  100 
Notes: *=significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
Transportation to buyer is for transportation beyond the main road. Most kale farmers will take produce 
to brokers near main road on a donkey cart. 
Source: authors’ farmer survey 2003.  
 
In terms of organizational capital, table 4 shows some interesting variation. While the degree of 
collaboration amongst kale farmers is not related to the channel they operate in, the nature of this 
collaboration is related. Kale farmers in the traditional channel collaborate mostly on the 
marketing side, bulking their produce to facilitate transporting it themselves to the wholesale 
market where they get a better price (this type of collaboration is more prevalent as the farms are 
located closer to Nairobi). Kale farmers in the supermarket channel, who know each other in part 
because of the farmer meetings organized several times per year by the supermarkets, mostly 
collaborate on production issues (sharing of best practices). For tomatoes, it is the traditional-
channel farmers who collaborate more because it allows them to overcome their small size and 
jointly transport their produce to the wholesalers in Nairobi. This is related to the nature of the 
tomatoes which require proper synchronizing of production and marketing (once at the right 
ripening stage for the intended market, tomatoes need to be harvested relatively quickly). This 
means that tomato farmers in the traditional channel (who for the greater part have no 
transportation) are more at the mercy of (collecting) brokers, a dependency they try to avoid by 
taking the marketing of their tomatoes in their own hands through collective action. Tomato 
growers in the supermarket channel on the other hand have their own transportation (as well as a  
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larger volume) and therefore have less incentive to collaborate with other farmers. For bananas 
on the other hand it is the supermarket-channel farmers who collaborate more. This is because 
these farmers (1) want to collaborate on the production side, trying new banana varieties and new 
propagation techniques such as tissue culture bananas; and (2) these farmers are trying to 
develop new marketing supply chains for bananas, with some farmers taking the lead and 
organizing other growers. While point (1) above results from the fact that supermarket-channel 
farmers are better educated and thus have better access to new technologies (not from any 
specific initiative of the supermarkets), point (2) is to some extent stimulated by the growth of 
supermarkets. For example, one of the supermarket banana suppliers (who uses tissue culture 
bananas) found that the Kampala banana was more popular amongst consumers than the 
Cavendish banana he was growing, but realized that the Cavendish’s longer shelf life would still 
make it the winner in supermarkets. Having been a supplier to  Uchumi since 2001, he has 
worked out a concept for a supplier organization (with collection points for multiple farmers, 
cold storage, and ripening rooms in Nairobi) that could provide the supermarkets with the banana 
supply they need (year-round supply of good quality bananas with a long shelf-life). The main 
(basically only) obstacle to the realization of his concept is a lack of capital.  
Table 4 indicates that there is greater participation in cooperatives or associations 
amongst traditional channel farmers than amongst supermarket-channel farmers. An important 
reason for this is that the former are linked in cooperatives or associations related to non-FFV 
products. For example, an important diversification strategy of traditional-channel farmers is to 
go into dairy and many of those with dairy cows are a member of a dairy cooperative (this is 
especially the case for the kale growers in Kiambu district)
4. While about half of the 
supermarket-channel farmers also have livestock (especially kale farmers), very few (less than 
5%) of them are members of a dairy cooperative. Other traditional-channel farmers are part of 
formal self-help groups (especially women), mostly with the objective to pool financial resources 
and create a revolving fund from which members can draw to make investments or deal with 
emergencies. Some of the traditional tomato and banana farmers in Kirinyaga and Muranga 
districts also grow coffee and are members of coffee coops. Only two FFV cooperatives were 
encountered within the study’s sample, both for traditional-channel farmers in Muranga district. 
The first is the Mukago Bio-Banana Group which is focused on organic growing methods for 
bananas intended for the domestic market and has 60 members who are organized around a 
farmer field school. The other is the Koome Self Help Group which has 156 members and is 
focused on the marketing of horticultural crops. Farmers did indicate that coop membership 
gives them greater access to low-interest loans which they could use in their FFV farming and 
which could facilitate market access. However, the data presented here clearly indicate that coop 
membership is not a determinant of access to the supermarket channel at this point in time. The 
main reason for group formation amongst FFV farmers is to overcome a small scale which 
stands in the way of efficient marketing. Supermarket-channel farmers, because of their size, 
have less need to group themselves for marketing purposes. 
  Finally, table 4 points to some differences in the marketing practices of the two farmer 
groups. First, supermarket-channel farmers market a higher percentage of their crop than do 
traditional-channel farmers. This is in part related to the latter’s smaller size, which implies that 
home-consumption plays a more significant role. However, FFV are mainly intended for selling 
                                                 
4 Livestock/dairy provides a perfect complement to FFV production as it transforms the nearly worthless FFV 
wastage into meat, milk and manure. For smallholder producers dairy is also important because it creates a more 
continuous income to offset the more erratic income from FFV.  
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to the market as for all three produce items and for both types of farmers more than 70% of the 
production is marketed (it is nearly 100% for the supermarket-channel farmers). Second, the way 
in which the produce is marketed differs between the two supply channels in important ways. 
Supermarket-channel farmers receive their orders by phone, transport the ordered produce to the 
supermarket and keep records of their deliveries in order to be able to follow up with payments. 
By contrast, traditional-channel farmers just harvest when they think the market price is good (or 
when they can no longer postpone harvesting), sell the produce either from the farm or take it by 
bicycle or donkey cart to a collection market near the main road and keep no records of their 
transactions. These differences hold across the three produce items as could be expected given 
that they are directly determined by channel choice (by the supermarkets). 
 
Differences in Marketing Capacity 
 
Looking across the four tables in this section, it becomes apparent that supermarket-channel 
farmers differ greatly from traditional-channel farmers in their marketing practices because they 
differ greatly with respect to their marketing capacity. The latter has four components. First, 
there is a physical capital component. Nearly all supermarket-channel farmers have a pick-up 
truck, a packing shed and a cell-phone. Renting transportation provides less control and farmers 
may supply markets too late (loose a buyer or face lower prices). Second, there is a human 
capital component. Supermarket-channel farmers have a larger labor force (needed to allow for 
short order-cycles) and better business management skills. The latter follows from their higher 
level of education and more extensive business experience (e.g., having had their own non-farm 
business or experience with supplying FFV to exporters, institutions, wholesalers). Third, there is 
a risk component. Supermarket-channel farmers’ risk management strategies are more market-
focused: more diversified income, more market options, more produce items. Compare this to 
small-scale farmers whose risk management tools focus on the production side and include 
keeping quasi-fixed capital low, minimizing cash outflows and integrating horticulture with 
livestock/dairy. Fourth, there is a working capital component. Accessing the supermarket 
channel greatly increase working capital needs, as payment periods shift from zero days (the 
cash-on-delivery used in the traditional channel) to periods of up to 30 days
5. Again, these 
differences over a broad set of capacity variables indicate the existence of a threshold capital 
vector at the entrance of the supermarket supply channel. 
Given the limited marketing options available to smallholder farmers, it is not surprising 
that our survey reveals that 60% of the traditional-channel farmers say they have never thought 
about supplying supermarkets. The 40% who did think about it either had no idea on how to 






4.2 The Relative Impact of Export Channel Farmers in the Supermarket Channel  
                                                 
5 The up and downs of supermarkets can increase the working capital challenge. Cash flow difficulties at Uchumi in 
2004 led to partial payments to FFV suppliers. One farmer for example indicated that the supermarket held two 
months worth of his turnover in its accounts payable to him. Only farmers with sufficient financial working capital 
can survive such cash-flow pressure and remain in the supermarket channel.  
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Exporters and export-channel farmers are only of limited importance as suppliers of FFV to 
supermarkets, with only 10-15% of supermarket-channel farmers being involved in export 
markets as well. Exporters are critical in some produce lines (mostly the higher value, lower 
volume items such as French beans or avocado), and absent in other produce lines (most 
domestic market fruits and vegetables, e.g. banana, tomato, kale). Mainly this is because there is 
little overlap in product types. For example, for kale, tomato and banana (which combined 
represent in volume terms 50% of the domestic FFV production), exports are insignificant (less 
than 100MT in 2002; MoARD 2002). These produce items find ready markets in Kenya and 
FFV exporters have instead focused on (directed their capital toward) higher value produce items 
such as French beans, snow peas, Asian vegetables (okra, eggplant) and avocadoes (these exports 
also include fresh-cut, shelf-ready (and at times even labeled) vegetable packs for supermarket 
chains in the EU). For fruits, the only two items which are of importance to both the export and 
the domestic market are mango and passion fruit, but even then only 4% of production is being 
exported.  
The importance of exporters thus critically depends on the type of produce. The three 
main instances where the export and the domestic supermarket channels do overlap are: (1) semi-
processed fresh vegetable packs of typical export produce items such as French beans or 
snowpeas (90% comes from exporters); (2) Asian vegetables, such as okra and eggplant, mainly 
directed to the large Asian community (50% comes from exporters); (3) fruits which are of some 
importance for exports, i.e., pineapple
6, avocado, mango and passion fruit (20-100% coming 
from exporters, e.g., 100% for pineapple, 20% for mango).  
Farmers who are linked to both the export channel and the domestic market channel (like 
the 10% of the supermarket-channel farmers mentioned here), in many cases do so for different 
produce items (or even non-produce items: two of the supermarket-channel farmers in our 
sample exported flowers). For example, a farm may produce French beans as an outgrower for 
one of Kenya’s major FFV exporters and at the same time produce tomatoes as a listed supplier 
to supermarkets in the domestic market. Typically these farmers are: (1) first involved in the 
export channel for a particular crop (say French beans); (2) using the experience and earnings 
from exports to expand their capital vector (land expansion, additional vehicles, construction of a 
packing shed, familiarity with good agricultural practices, and so on); and (3) then using their 
increased capital assets to also enter the supermarket channel as producers of domestic market 
crop (say spinach). The other instance where the export channel and the supermarket channel 
overlap is when the leading exporters divert some of their production (second grade unless there 
is oversupply) from the export market to the domestic market (see for example the case of 
Sunripe, section 4.4). And even here, there is a tendency to move away from the exporter: Fresh 
‘n Juici, Nakumatt’s specialized FFV supplier, is doing most of the fresh-cut processing in-house 
(in part because supermarkets want affordable, first grade produce for their customers). 
However, the volumes involved are of relatively minor importance to both the exporter (almost 
all is exported) and the domestic supermarket (almost all FFV sales are for domestic market 
crops; although this is likely to increase in importance as supermarkets increase their market 
share in the FFV market). 
                                                 
6 Fresh pineapples are not very important in Kenya’s FFV exports, but Kenya’s largest pineapple producer 
(DelMonte) is a major exporter of canned pineapple, while at the same time it sells fresh pineapples and pineapple 
juice in the domestic market (including supermarkets).  
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For farmers, the difference in accessibility between the supermarket channel and the export 
market channel depends in great part on their size. Whereas (some) smallholder producers can 
access the export channel through various outgrower schemes
7, this is far less feasible in the 
supermarket channel since few such outgrower schemes exist and hence fewer smallholder 
producers are involved (apart from through traditional brokers, but supermarkets are moving 
away from brokers; Neven and Reardon 2004). 
 
4.3 Supermarket-Channel Farmers Categorized 
 
When we look at the supermarket-channel farmers as a group, it becomes apparent that to a large 
extent they represent a newly emerging class of farmers in Kenya. In the previous two sections 
we made the case that supermarket-channel farmers are distinct from both the typical traditional-
channel farmers and the export-channel farmers. So where then does this emerging class of 
farmers come from? Based on our random sample of 49 farmers from the leading supermarkets’ 
FFV supplier lists, we can distinguish four types of supermarket-channel farmers: (1) specialized 
farms, whose main focus is the production of FFV for domestic supermarkets; (2) intensifying 
farms, whose main focus is not FFV for the domestic market, but who use part of their resources 
to also supply FFV to supermarkets; (3) specialty product farms, whose main focus is value-
added FFV (e.g., vegetable packs) which they supply to supermarket amongst others; and (4) 
market diversifying farms, whose main focus is FFV for the domestic market, but who do not 
have the domestic supermarkets as their main focus.  
 
Type 1: Specialized Farms 
 
The first type consists of recently established farms (in the last 10 years) that linked up with 
supermarkets in the last 5 years, started shifting to supplying mainly or even only domestic 
supermarkets and experienced fast growth since. An estimated 43% of the farmers fall in this 
category, all of them mainly growing vegetables. In many cases, the farmer is a well-educated 
individual who has or had a primary job in Nairobi (e.g., private or public sector employees, 
small business owners) and invested his or her savings in land (landownership also has an 
important socio-cultural meaning in Kenyan society). This land was at first either not used, used 
for non-intensive farming (e.g., maize) or used for intensive farming (horticulture), but remained 
mostly a hobby for its owner. Some of the more entrepreneurial farmers in this group took 
samples of their produce to the supermarket’s produce procurement manager in order to get a 
trial order and farmers successful in getting the quantity, quality and delivery right for the initial 
supplies succeeded in linking up with the supermarkets in a more long term relationship (i.e., the 
usual way farmers got linked up with supermarkets once the latter started to really expand the 
FFV category). Once they gained entry, these farmers quickly realized the potential (increasing 
supply orders from supermarkets coming in), but found that continued access would require them 
to make additional investments in production and marketing technology and run their farms 
under more professional management. In many cases, it implied an exit from other professional 
engagements (albeit not necessarily for both spouses in a household). In other cases, farms were 
set up from the start for full-time, commercial farming. 
                                                 
7 Albeit increasingly less so due to the increasingly stringent food safety standards in the export channel (see for 
example Dolan and Humprey 2000).  
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A typical example of a farmer of this type is L Farm
8. L farm was started in 1999 by a former 
employee of the Central Bank of Kenya who over time had build up a three-branch supermarket 
chain in the greater Nairobi metro area. L-farm initially supplied its own supermarkets. Since its 
start in 1999, the farm has specialized in leafy green vegetables (because of their high turnover) 
and almost exclusively supplied supermarkets (because they offered the best prices and presented 
the lowest transaction costs as they buy in large volumes). As the supermarket sector was 
growing and becoming more competitive, the farmer felt his competitive advantage was in 
farming and so he sold his supermarkets for premium prices to the leading supermarket chains 
and invested the proceeds in the expansion and upgrading of his farm. The farm is located 35km 
south of Nairobi in the dry, very sparsely populated areas of Kiserian district on three pieces of 
land bought from the pastoral Masai tribe. It is relatively inexpensive land with almost boundless 
expansion options, only limited by the presence of aquifer layers. The latter must be accessed by 
boreholes of which L Farm has installed two. Given the limited availability of water, 64% of the 
farmed area is under an efficient drip irrigation system which allows the farm to grow and supply 
FFV year-round. Supplies of leafy vegetables (e.g., kale) to the Nairobi market show strong 
seasonal patterns (as most of the production takes place under rainfed conditions) with shortages 
(especially of good quality produce) occurring during several months each year. L farm’s ability 
to produce good quality leafy vegetables in those low-supply months thus addresses the 
supermarket’s key requirement of year-round supply ability of farmers.  
L Farm started from an initial size of 30 acres in 1999. In 2001 it began supplying the 
leading supermarket chains, Uchumi and Nakumatt, growing along with them as they expanded 
their produce sections. By 2004, L Farm had grown to 110 acres (of which 55 are farmed, the 
rest set aside for future expansion), had four transportation vehicles and three hand-tractors and 
employed 50 workers. Not withstanding this high growth rate, the farmer indicated that he could 
have increased his production much faster if affordable credit would have been available to 
invest in additional boreholes. The absence of such credit is the farmer’s most critical problem 
and one he has been trying to discuss with supermarkets, requesting them (1) to provide farmers 
like him (who have all the right capacities: market knowledge, size, irrigation system, close to 
Nairobi, and so on) with formal supply agreements that can be used to demonstrate credit 
worthiness of farmers and (2) to even broker with commercial banks or other lending institutions 
to provide affordable credit to their (listed) FFV suppliers. In conclusion, the case of L Farm 
demonstrates the emergence of a list of preferred FFV suppliers in the supermarket’s strategy to 
assure supply consistency. This is similar to what has been observed elsewhere (see for example 
Berdegue et all. (2004) for the case of Central America).  
 
Type 2: Intensifying Farms 
 
The second type of supermarket-channel farmer consists of larger farms with extensive business 
experience whose main economic activity is not FFV production for the domestic market, but 
who use part of their land for the latter in order not to leave it laying idle. These main activities 
(which are to these farms more profitable than the supply of FFV to supermarkets) are varied and 
include flowers or vegetables grown for export, tea, livestock and dairy processing, amongst 
others. In most cases, FFV were first supplied to traditional-channel agents, such as wholesalers, 
                                                 
8 Farm names are withheld throughout this essay in order to comply with the MSU/UCRIHS stipulations.  
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and only later to domestic supermarkets (when these became bigger sellers of FFV). We can 
classify 22% of the supermarket-channel farmers in this category. 
A good example here is SR Farm. SR Farm is an exporter of flowers to the EU. The 250-
acre farm has 258 employees and was a coffee plantation until 2000. With coffee prices 
depressed, the farm shifted to alternative, more lucrative horticultural products with 60 acres 
under horticulture by 2003 (the remaining 190 acres are still under coffee but are not harvested 
(because of the low prices) nor uprooted because of government restrictions and for strategic 
reasons, i.e., a future increase in coffee prices). Of these 60 acres, 12.5 acres were allocated to 
the production of roses for export which are now the main focus of the farm (they are the most 
profitable part, high turnover per acre). Another part of those 60 acres is devoted to vegetables 
for the export market (e.g., 8 acres of French beans). However, most of the 60 acres under 
horticulture is used for the production of FFV intended for the domestic market For the latter 
they produce a wide variety of items, including 3 acres of bananas, 4 acres of cabbages and 14 
acres of kale. Of the kale about 60% was marketed to the supermarkets and 40% to traditional 
local markets. Their expansive, advanced irrigation system (covering 100 acres) allows them to 
produce FFV during the off-season. The farm is capital intensive using 5 tractors, two trucks, 
charcoal and electric coolers, modern packing sheds and greenhouses (1/2 ha).  
For supermarkets, the main attraction points of SR Farm are its large supply capacity, its 
ability to supply constantly throughout the year and its business skills, which make it easy to 
order from them (e.g., place orders by phone, pay through bank transfers, and so on). While there 
is a loosely followed continuous supply agreement between SR Farm and Uchumi, the farm 
would like to move to a stricter implemented supply contract. Without the latter SR Farm is 
unlikely to make additional investments in its FFV production for the domestic market (such as 
making the organizational investments needed to optimize its harvest cycles to the needs of the 
supermarkets). 
 
Type 3: Specialty Product Farms 
 
The third type of supermarket-channel farmer, of minor importance at this point in time (4% of 
suppliers), consists of specialty produce suppliers who have catered to more sophisticated 
markets domestically or abroad. Here we find for example the producers of pre-packaged, pre-
cut vegetables for export. 
An interesting example is provided by GD Farm. Started in 2000 as a supplier to the 
airline and tourism industry, GD Farm is a 10 acre farm specialized in organic mixed salad 
packs, although it produces various other organic FFV as well (e.g., strawberries). Because all 
products are organic, produce items can be marketed for twice the price of their conventional 
counterparts. The farm has 30 employees, is fully irrigated, has five acres under shadow netting, 
has a washing and packing shed and complies with HACCP standards as this is demanded by the 
airlines. In order to get its highly perishable salad bags in good condition to customers, they use 
the cold chain system of a leading meat processor, with whom they forged a partnership. Its salad 
bags are bar-coded and labeled under their own brand name. In 2003, the airline and tourism 
industry on the one hand and the domestic supermarkets on the other hand, each took about half 
of its supplies. Its past growth has been financed by loans, retained earnings and credit by 
suppliers (e.g., of irrigation equipment). The farm is developing various new products to extend 
its range and plans to increase the acreage under production as well as make additional 
investments in irrigation. The main attraction for supermarkets of having GD Farm as a FFV  
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supplier is that (1) it helps them complete both their line of value-added vegetable packs and 
their line of organic FFV items, which is important in attracting the higher income consumer 
segment; (2) it has the capacity (experience from other sectors, packing shed, clean water, and so 
on) to wash, package, correctly weigh and label the product (important aspects for these higher 
value-added produce items intended for the more discerning high-income consumer segment); 
and (3) it has the capacity to supply these produce items year-round (irrigation system).  
 
Type 4: Market Diversifying Farms 
 
The fourth type of supermarket-channel farmers consists of a varied group of farmers whose 
main product focus is FFV for the domestic market, but for whom supermarkets are not the main 
focus. These farmers have merely diversified their market by supplying part of their output to 
supermarkets without showing much change in their farm practices or turnover because of it. Of 
the supermarket-channel farmers, 31% fall into this category. Here we find most of the fruit 
suppliers, which include (i) farms who have recently shifted from coffee (low prices) to bananas 
or from export crops (market exclusion, e.g. due to inability to meet quality requirements in 
export markets) to vegetables for the domestic market, (ii) medium-sized to large fruit growers 
and (iii) big plantation farms such as Delmonte (13,000 acres of pineapples). For the larger 
producers in this category, supermarkets are expected to have little or no impact for the next five 
to ten years, as they represent only a minor part of the turnover of these producers. However, 
small and medium sized farms in this category are expected over time to either fully engage in 
the supermarket channel (thus becoming farmers of the first type) or to exit this channel because 
the participation costs or the opportunity costs are too high. 
F Farm is an example of the smaller farmers in this category of supermarket-channel 
suppliers who finds himself at such a cross-road. Established in 1997, F Farm is a 15 acre farm 
near Naivasha (85km west of Nairobi) which employs 4 full-time workers and 10 casuals when 
needed. The farmer used to be in poultry, but exited this market when prices were too low. He 
then shifted to FFV, growing a very wide variety of FFV (13 different crops at the time of the 
interview, from celery over broccoli to papaya). Some of these items are sold to the leading 
supermarket chains (since 2000) in addition to traditional buyers. For example, 80% of his 
spinach sales go to the supermarket while 20% goes to the main wholesale markets in Nairobi. 
Whatever cannot be marketed for either lack of quality or lack of demand goes to waste.  
For the supermarket, F Farm is a qualified supplier because it has an irrigation system, its 
own transportation, a phone, and so on, indicating it can meet the requirements for year-round 
supplies and short order-cycles (in the case of more perishable leafy vegetables). The farmer 
likes selling to the supermarkets because they are easy to supply to (less time-consuming), 
because the volumes are larger and because the payment systems allows him to organize the 
farm’s accounts (e.g., worker payments). The problem is that the orders he gets are too erratic 
(supermarkets telling him “call tomorrow or the day after”), which makes it difficult to organize 
the harvesting. The farmer also feels that receiving agents at supermarkets are not knowledgeable 
about produce and that supermarkets take too long to pay him (up to a month). If this changes 
and he gets more stable orders, he would further invest in the farm (especially irrigation) and 
would likely become a dedicated supermarket-channel farmer. If things remain as they are, the 
farmer will likely exit the supermarket channel, already indicating that should prices for poultry 
get better, he would move back into that direction. 
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4.4 Cases of Smallholder Farmer Groups Supplying Supermarkets 
 
Based on the estimated FFV turnover and distribution over the different types of suppliers 
(Neven and Reardon 2004), we estimate that around 1,000 smallholder farmers were part of the 
supplier base of the supermarkets in 2003. These farmers supply (1) indirectly through 
brokers/wholesalers (roughly 900 farmers) and (2) as (irregular) direct suppliers to individual 
stores, mostly for highly perishable vegetables like leafy greens to up-country branches (roughly 
100 farmers). With supermarkets shifting away from brokers to direct supplies by farmers and 
moving to procurement centralization (Neven and Reardon 2004), the importance of smallholder 
producers in the supermarket channel is expected to dwindle to about 20% of FFV supplies (their 
absolute number will be determined by the FFV turnover in supermarkets as this is growing 
rapidly from a small base). 
Given this bleak scenario for smallholder producer participation in the supermarket 
channel on the one hand and the rising importance of supermarkets and the potential benefits of 
becoming a regular (listed) supplier to them (see section 5) on the other hand, we briefly present 
five cases that demonstrate different strategies that may allow for a greater participation by 
smallholder farmers in the supermarket channel. These cases represent all the formats we could 
identify (based on interviews with industry experts, including the supermarkets’ FFV 
procurement managers) of smallholder involvement other than through traditional-channel 
brokers or through direct supplies. The types of suppliers presented in these cases were not 
included in the distribution of the FFV suppliers presented earlier because they represent (in this 
early stage of supermarket development) too small a fraction of the supermarket’s FFV supplies 
(<1%). Across the five cases, three key success factors emerge: (1) a focus on products with a 
clear market potential; (2) the catalyzing involvement of private or public organizations as 
marketing facilitators with a commercial basis (i.e., intended to be sustainable without 
subsidies); and (3) group formation amongst farmers. The case-information is mostly based on 
in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, but also on secondary information sources. 
 
Case 1: Family Concern – An NGO Organizing Smallholder Farmers 
 
Family Concern, a Kenyan NGO whose mission it is to combine development and business 
objectives in building marketing linkages for small scale growers, is the lead organization in a 
project that aims to facilitate the supply of traditional African vegetables (TAV)
9 from 
smallholder producers to domestic supermarkets in Kenya. The International Plant and Genetic 
Resources Institute (IPGRI) and the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) where 
involved as technical partners on the production side, FARM Africa (a UK based NGO) was 
involved to provide expertise and financial support and Uchumi was involved on the marketing 
side. 
Based on consumer market studies, Family Concern had identified that (1) there existed a 
high and growing demand for TAV, and (2) that this demand was not matched by supplies. 
Uchumi had come to the same conclusion as it could not keep these vegetables on the shelves 
and was trying (but not fast enough succeeding) in getting its listed FFV suppliers to produce 
more. In 2003, Uchumi estimated that potential demand for TAV was three times the actual sales 
of 100MT per month. When in 2003, Family Concern approached Uchumi with the proposal to 
                                                 
9 These are leafy vegetables such as black nightshade, spiderplant, cowpeas and amaranth.  
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organize smallholder farmers for the production and marketing of TAV, the supermarket was 
very interested to get involved. Family Concern and its partners then went to work, enlisting 50 
smallholder producers in the rural and peri-urban areas around Nairobi (with on average .25 
acres available for TAV) and organizing them in a sort of outgrower scheme to organically grow 
TAV under well-defined good agricultural practices (e.g., with regard to use of clean water). 
Farmers receive seed and technical assistance, are inspected with regard to their farm practices 
and are, since 2004, marketing their produce through Family Concern, who is responsible for 
transporting the bunches of TAV to Uchumi based on the latter’s order schedule. In order to 
differentiate its product in the market place, Family Concern supports its product with in-store 
advertising and plans to introduce its own label (African Delicacies). 
The project benefits farmers as well as the supermarket. Farmers get assistance in 
growing a cash-flow friendly product (ready for harvest after only 4-5 weeks, pest and diseases 
resistant) for a reliable market, while Uchumi resolves (at least partially) one of its key FFV 
supply shortages, expands its lines of organic and branded FFV items and improves its image as 
it advertises its assistance to smallholder farmers to consumers in its stores. 
  
Case 2: HPHC – A Government-Owned Company Organizing Smallholder Farmers 
 
Established in 2003, the Horticultural Produce Handling Company (HPHC) is a government-
owned company set up to own and commercialize an elaborate modern cold chain infrastructure 
(financed by the Japan International Cooperation Agency JICA) which is intended to improve 
the marketing system for horticultural produce from smallholder producers. While initially 
managed by the parastatal Horticultural Crop Development Authority (HCDA), government 
involvement is expected to be greatly reduced over the period 2004-2005 (both in terms of 
ownership and management). An initial focus on the EU export market has been replaced by a 
dominantly domestic and East Africa regional focus because of difficulties in accessing export 
markets. HPHC’s facilities include seven satellite depots with pre-cooling units, a central 
warehouse in Nairobi (near Jomo Kenyatta International Airport) with cold storage facilities and 
insulated trucks of various capacities to maintain the cold chain from collection point to 
supermarket. 
  Under the stringent quality and safety requirements normally associated with the export 
market, farmers produce and supply as groups of 15-40 outgrowers to a collection center which 
has a charcoal cooler, a toilet and clean water. Selected farms have sizes varying from 0.125 to 2 
acres and are located within a 5km radius of a collection center (which is financed by the farmers 
themselves). Pre-cooled and insulated HPHC trucks (2MT capacity) then pick the produce from 
these collection points and take it to the nearest satellite depot. Larger trucks (8MT) take the 
produce from the satellite depots to the Horticultural Centre in Nairobi and from there to various 
buyers. Farmers get planting, harvesting and spraying schedules and technical assistance from 
HPHC as well as buy their seeds from them. For this organization of the farmers and the cold 
chain distribution, HPHC charged (in 2003) a low commission of 17% of the sales price leading 
to higher prices for farmers (the 17% is far below the 65% of the wholesale price going to 
brokers and wholesalers in the traditional channel). One of these buyers has been Uchumi who 
bought Asian vegetables from HPHC in 2003 (albeit for small volumes and on an irregular 
basis). 
HPHC has not started off as an instant success. Lack of marketing experience and trading 
network partners have largely kept it out of export markets and in 2003 the company was  
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operating at only 5% of its capacity. However, its recent shift in market focus to the domestic 
and regional market may fit well the strategic objectives and needs of a supermarket like 
Uchumi. HPHC can offer the volumes and the food quality and safety assurances that are key 
pillars in the FFV procurement system currently being developed by the leading supermarkets in 
Kenya.  It is therefore not surprising that in 2003 HPHC and Uchumi were exploring potential 
collaboration. If HPHC succeeds in getting its marketing strategies right (e.g., by getting 
supermarkets like Uchumi and others in the region such as South Africa’s Shoprite on its 
customer list) then its potential impact is large (HPHC’s management indicated to us that they 
aim to get a 5% share of the domestic FFV market by 2006).  
 
Case 3: Iga Muka – A Farmer Group Assisted by a Private Sector Marketing Facilitator 
 
Started in 1989, Iga Muka is a self-help group of about 30 smallholder farmers growing a wide 
variety of FFV on their farms located on the slopes of Mt Kenya (some 200km from Nairobi, i.e., 
further away than most FFV suppliers for the Nairobi market). The farmers group succeeded in 
linking up with Uchumi via the Kenya Agricultural Commodity Exchange (KACE). Operational 
since 2000, KACE is a private sector firm that facilitates linkages between sellers and buyers of 
agricultural commodities, in part by setting up market information points which have small 
trading floors where buyers and sellers (like Iga Muka and Uchumi) can interact. KACE gets its 
revenues from selling market price information on commodities (e.g., through SMS messages on 
farmer’s cellular phones) and taking commissions on brokered sales as well as from donor 
support (e.g., from USAID and DFID). Although it plans to overcome it, KACE was still 
dependent on donor support in 2003. 
In 2002, Iga Muka contacted KACE on the possibility of finding a market for its 
strawberries, which are the group’s biggest income earner. Through an initial contact at a KACE 
auction in Nairobi, Iga Muka placed a first order with Uchumi which then turned into a longer 
term supply arrangement. The strawberries are harvested and collected three times a week. In a 
small packing shed, the strawberries are graded according to size, stage or ripening and 
appearance and packaged in plastic punnets of 1/2kg. The product is not labeled, other than with 
a barcode to comply with supermarket requirements, as the costs of labeling are considered too 
high at this point. Iga Muka has a full-time grader on its payroll at the collection point and has a 
marketing agent (representative) in Nairobi. This agent collects the orders from Uchumi (and 
other buyers). As the group does not have its own transportation, it uses public transportation 
(mini-buses) to transport about 60 to 100kg of strawberries three times a week to Nairobi 
(200km of partially very rough roads). Small volumes of about 60-80kg of strawberries per 
week, out of a maximum of 300kg, are intended for Uchumi, the rest is either marketed through 
KACE to non-supermarket buyers (e.g., institutions, greengrocers, and so on) or goes to waste. 
  While the group has succeeded in remaining in the supermarket channel, it is not really 
equipped to supply supermarkets and has not been increasing its business because profits are too 
low and access to credit is restricted. For example the group would like to invest in small-scale 
processing equipment which would help solve the demand volatility problem as well as make the 
grading more efficient (first grade to supermarkets, lower grades for jam). However, it has not 
been able to build the capital from retained earnings while commercial loans are considered too 
risky. The absence of growth as well as increasingly delayed payments by Uchumi (which was 
working through some financial problems in 2003-2004) have lowered morale and undermined 
the internal stability of the group which would have exited the supermarket channel already if it  
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were not for its relatively transparent accounting system and for its good organization (i.e., a 
constitution that spells out a code of conduct for its members in addition to penalties for going 
against the group’s bylaws).  
 
Case 4: Sunripe – An Exporter with Smallholder Outgrowers Supplying Supermarkets 
 
Sunripe, a family business founded in 1969 and in 2004 one of Kenya’s largest FFV exporters, 
growing at an average annual rate of 20% over the last 15 years (Shah 2004), produces 40 
different high-value lines of fruits and vegetables from its own farms as well as from 1,000 
contracted smallholder producers. A (small) part of its output is sold to Uchumi. 
  Sunripe is a change leader in Kenya’s export industry. In 1999 for example, it was one of 
the first exporters in Kenya to start developing fresh-cut and washed & ready-to-eat vegetable 
prepacks for the export market. Because (1) there are lower grades of produce which fail to meet 
export standards and (2) there is sometimes oversupply if the quantity contracted from farmers 
exceeds fluctuating demand from buyers in the export market, exporter like Sunripe have excess 
produce for which they need alternative markets. Around the same time (since 1997 and onward) 
supermarkets like Uchumi were rapidly developing their FFV sections, continuously adding new 
items (especially in the hypermarkets). Given this strategic fit between supply and demand, 
Sunripe started supplying Uchumi with a number of different organically grown pre-packed 
vegetables (e.g., pre-cut French beans, mixed stir-fry vegetables, and so on), providing an 
alternative market for Sunripe and making a major contribution to both its line of organic 
products and its line of pre-packed vegetable products for Uchumi. Another area where the two 
companies are considering collaboration is with respect to the setting-up of quality and food 
safety control systems for Uchumi’s FFV suppliers. Sunripe, which became EurepGAP certified 
in October 2003, would be an excellent source of expertise in this area, especially with respect to 
the implementation of traceability systems (for food safety) amongst smallholder producers.  
Sunripe’s 1,000 smallholder outgrowers, thus demonstrate yet another way in which 
smallholder producers of FFV can be connected through non-traditional channels to domestic 
supermarkets in Kenya. However, recent research indicates that the implementation of 
increasingly stringent food safety standards imposed by EU supermarkets on their FFV suppliers 
will likely lead to a declining role for smallholder farmers in Kenya’s FFV export sector (Dolan 
and Humphrey 2000). 
 
Case 5: B Farm – A Lead Farmer Organizing Smallholder Farmers 
 
Another format under which smallholder growers could remain or become linked to 
supermarkets is that of a lead farmers who organizes and buys from a group of other farmers. 
While this type of supplier is not yet important in the supplier base of the supermarkets, it 
appears to be increasing in importance as several of these groups have emerged in 2003-2004. B 
Farm, a 16 acre family farm located 25km from Nairobi, provides a good example here. This 
farm was started in 1992 and began supplying kale to Uchumi in 2002. As the supermarket 
orders grew in size and regularity, the farmer decided to source kale from other farmers rather 
than to expand his own farm. By 2004, he sourced from 40 other farmers (mostly smallholders) 
who are as a group organized so that the supermarket can be supplied with bunches of kale on a 
daily basis. For the participating farmers, the key differences between selling to brokers or 
selling to B farm is that (i) they now face a much more secure demand for kale and (ii) they get a  
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better price (as B Farm pays a premium to secure supplies). These are crucial differences for 
smallholder farmers as risk reduction and higher profitability are important steps toward a 
growth dynamic. B farm is also a retailer of farm inputs which further facilitates access to inputs 
for the participating smallholder farmers and may be a precursor on the path to interlinked 
supply contracts.  
 
5. The Impact of Supermarkets in the Kale Supply Channel 
 
5.1 Kale Supply Channels in Kenya 
 
Kale Production Characteristics 
 
There are two key characteristics of kale production in Kenya that are important for the present 
analysis. First, most of the kale production in Kenya takes place under rain-fed conditions, 
leading to strong supply and price seasonality (annual production cycles are tuned to a short rains 
and a long rains season). This implies that for supermarkets, who want year-round supplies, kale 
must be ordered from farmers who have irrigation and a year-round source of water. Second, 
there are no specific, formal quality or food safety standards in the domestic market (in the 
traditional channel nor in the supermarket channel) but quality, mostly determined by freshness, 
leaf size and color and the degree of damage due to pests or other decay, does play a role in price 
determination. For the supermarkets who want to differentiate themselves on quality, only the 
best quality of FFV will be accepted. This implies that farmers supplying supermarkets must be 
able to control quality (e.g., through pest management, by being located close to Nairobi so the 
highly perishable kale arrives fresh, and so on).  
 
Kale Supply Chains 
 
The entry of supermarkets in the kale supply chain leads to supply channel integration. Kale 
farmers in Kenya have potentially four market options, depending on their capacities: (1) they 
sell to brokers from their farm; (2) they sell to brokers near the main road; (3) they sell to 
wholesalers in main urban areas; and (4) they sell directly to retailers or institutions. Which 
option is chosen is mostly determined by the transportation capacity of the farmer and his or her 
willingness to take risks (the more downstream the farmer takes the produce, the higher the 
price, but also the higher the transportation costs and the higher the price risks). Given that most 
traditional-channel farmers are risk-averse smallholder producers without (motorized) 
transportation, most farmers in this channel sell to brokers at the farm or near the main road 
(rural collection market). For example, in our farmer sample we found that of the Lari farmers (at 
60km from Nairobi), 52% sell kale from the farm, 38% take it to the main road and 10% take it 
to wholesale markets in Nairobi. Supermarket-channel farms on the other hand are larger and 
have their own transportation and are capable of taking their produce direct to the supermarkets. 
Figure 1 compares the traditional market channel with the supermarket channel for kale, 
indicating the distribution of the marketing margin over the supply chain’s successive economic 
agents, as well as an indication of the size (in terms of sales volume) of these economic agents 
for the traditional channel. Figure 1 indicates that the shift from the standard traditional supply 
chain to the supermarket supply chain for kale implies a vertical integration, with the farmer 
integrating the broker and part of the wholesale function and capturing a far greater part of the 
marketing margin. This extends earlier research on the applicability of market channel theory in  
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Kenya to the supermarket channel. Dijkstra (2001) showed how channel theory (i.e., vertical 
channel disintegration (i.e., the number of successive distinct business entities in the supply 
chain) is negatively correlated with the size of producers and retailers) could explain long supply 
channels for FFV in Kenya. Here we find the mirror image: supermarkets (as large retailers) and 
supermarket-channel farmers (as larger producers) lead to short (direct) supply channels. 
 
Figure 1: Marketing Margins in Kale Supply Chains 
 
Note: margin to input suppliers in traditional chain assumes farmers buy seeds and manure, rather than use their 
own. 
Source: authors’ farmer survey, interviews with 15 channel participants, including brokers, wholesalers and retailers 
and price-measurements throughout the chain. 
 
Traditional Kale Supply Chains 
 
Traditional kale supply chains provide marketing solutions to smallholder farmers, but are 
characterized by a small percentage of the marketing margin captured by the farmer, high 
transaction costs (produce changes ownerships many times) and brokers with high market power 
(they trade the largest volumes and are most knowledgeable about prices at the farm and in the 
wholesale markets). In the standard traditional supply chain for kale, a farmer stuffs the 
harvested kale leafs in bags of 75kg and takes them by donkey cart to an open air collection 
market near the main road to Nairobi
10. At this rural market, independently operating brokers 
                                                 
10 Alternatively, the farmer may sell directly off-farm to a broker who was directed to the farm by agents hired by 










































arrive with a pick-up or a larger lorry. They negotiate the prices with farmers and, once a price is 
agreed upon, they pay loaders to load the lorry to maximum capacity. The broker then takes the 
kale bags to one of the wholesale markets in Nairobi, pays a fee to enter the market, and starts 
negotiating prices again, this time with several wholesalers
11. Once a price is agreed upon off-
loaders are paid by the buyer to unload the bags of kale. It takes about 10 wholesalers to buy a 
whole lorry-load of kale and so it can take brokers the better part of a day to sell it all. 
Wholesalers then take leafs from the bags and bunch them in bunches of approximately 650gr. In 
the next step, small, traditional retailers such as market stalls, kiosks or street hawkers come to 
the wholesale market where prices (this time per bunch) are once more negotiated. Retailers then 
pay cart pullers to bring the bought produce to their retail outlet. These retailers then break up the 
bunches into smaller bunches of maybe 200gr and offer them for sale to the end-consumer, who 
again will negotiate the price.  
While quite challenging for the resource-poor, risk-averse smallholder producers (who 
form the bulk of the producers in the traditional channel), there are variations to the above supply 
chain structure which allow farmers to capture more of the marketing margin and reach an 
intermediate step to selling to supermarkets. Farmers may form small groups whose combined 
harvest is sufficiently large to make it economical to rent a truck and take the produce directly to 
the wholesale market or even to retailers (some of the ad hoc supplies of kale to supermarkets 
come from smallholder farmers this way). Farmers may also bunch the kale leafs themselves in 
order to capture the value-added. When bunches are made closer to the farm, they are usually 
transported in extra large bags (approximately 200kg).  
 
The Supermarket Kale Supply Chain 
 
At the other extreme is the supermarket supply chain for kale, which is relative to the traditional 
supply channel shorter, more efficient from a transaction cost point of view, allows the farmer to 
capture a large portion of the marketing margin (farmer and supermarket each capture a part of 
the wholesaler’s margin) and controlled by the supermarket in stead of by the broker (who 
disappears). The supermarket calls the farmer in the afternoon with the order for the next day, 
indicating also if the price has changed since the last order and if so by how much. Early in the 
morning of the next day, the farmer puts his entire workforce (if needed supplemented with 
casual labor) on the kale harvest, and in about 2 hours the farm workers have picked and 
bunched enough leafs to fill the order and have loaded them directly on a truck (no bags), 
covered with canvas. The farm’s driver then takes the kale to the supermarket’s reception bay, 
has the delivery-book filled out and returns to the farm less then an hour after delivery. 
Supermarket employees place the kale bunches in the FFV section. The farmer is paid bi-weekly 
(in principle) for the cumulative supply over that time period. Given the wide variety of produce 
items grown by supermarket-channel farmers, they usually supply more than one item per 




                                                                                                                                                             
farmer may pay another farmer to take her or his bags to the road-side market. 
11 Alternatively, a small group of wholesalers may join forces and hire a transporter to go to the rural market to buy 
a number of bags of kale or they place a joint order with an established broker.  
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5.2 Determinants of Farmer Participation in the Supermarket Channel  
 
In this section we want to assess how farm characteristics determine the participation of the farm 
in the supermarket channel for kale (Y). Since negative dependent variables are not possible and 
assuming non-linear effects of the explanatory variables, we modeled this channel adoption 
decision as a probit model. The model takes on the following form: 
 
Prob (Y=1|X) = G(β0 + Xβ), 
 
where G is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. In their most general form, 
adoption functions contain the following five categories of explanatory variables: prices of inputs 
and outputs, risk factors, quasi-fixed capital and shift factors. Prices of inputs and outputs were 
not directly included as they are implicit in the channel choice and further determined by the size 
and location of the farm. The risk factor and quasi-fixed capital explanatory variables we want to 
include here capture risk-sensitivity (land ownership), land capital (size of the farm), access to 
financial capital (size of land and ownership, education), human capital (age, education, gender) 
and physical capital (presence of an irrigation system). Each of these explanatory variables is 
hypothesized to ceteris paribus increase the probability of adoption of the supermarket channel. 
With regard to gender it is hypothesized that men are more likely to enter the supermarket 
channel because they (1) are assumed to have better access to the required production factors and 
(2) tend to get more involved when the transactions become more formal, sizeable and rewarding 
(Dolan 2001). Two variables normally presented in adoption models, household size (quasi-fixed 
capital) and location (shift factor), were omitted here. Most of the supermarket-channel farmers 
rely for the greater part on (often large numbers of) hired employees, making size of the 
household (indicating the availability of family labor) not a very meaningful variable. Location 
was left out the model because the traditional-channel farmers were selected from only two 
nearby divisions so that for this sub-sample there was too little variation over the location 
variable. One further departure from the standard adoption model is that for the size of the farm, 
land ownership and the presence (or absence) of an irrigation system we used the 1999 situation. 
The 1999 data reflect the position of the farms at the time when they became suppliers to 
supermarkets (all the supermarket-channel farmers became suppliers to supermarkets around or 
shortly after 1999). If we would have used the current situation (e.g., the size of the farm in 
2004) then there could potentially be an endogeneity problem as farm-size could well have been 
influenced by supermarket channel participation. Based on the above, the implementation model 
has the following determinant variables (X):    
 
(a) the percentage of the farm size that is owned in 1999 (percent owned 99); 
(b) the size of the farm in acres in 1999 (size 99); 
(c) the number of years of schooling of the head of the farm (education of head); (d) the 
age in years of the head of the farm (age of head); 
(e) the gender of the head of the farm (gender of head); and 
(f) a dummy variable indicating if the farm had an irrigation system (sprinkler or drip) in 
1999 (irrigation 99).  
 
Based on maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), Table 5 presents the probit estimators (β ˆ
i) of 
the above model. Table 5 indicates that the results are as hypothesized, namely, the probability of  
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a farm participating in the supermarket channel increases as the farm (i) is larger and (ii) has a 
drip or overhead irrigation. The marginal effect indicates that, for the average farm (in terms of 
the independent variables), having one more acre of land (i.e., a relatively large 10% increase 
relative to the average size of 10 acres) increased the probability that the farm will participate in 
the supermarket channel with nearly 12% while having a drip or overhead irrigation system 
increases this probability with a dramatic 46%. The latter indicates that having irrigation is a 
critical capital requirement for farms who want to become FFV suppliers to supermarkets. 
Education, age, gender and land-ownership did not have ceteris paribus a statistically significant 
impact on the probability of a farm participating in the supermarket channel in our sample.  
 
Table 5: Determinants of Farmer Adoption of the Supermarket Channel (Probit Results) 
Independent variables  P(Supplies kale to 
supermarkets) (s.e.) 
Marginal effect 
Size 99  0.30 (0.157)*  +11.8% 
Education head  0.19 (0.164)  - 
Percent owned 99  -0.01 (0.014)  - 
Irrigation 99  1.35 (0.746)*  +46% 
Gender of head  0.55 (1.078)  - 
Age of head  0.02 (0.031)  - 
Constant -5.76  (3.930)  - 
No. of observations  57 
(Pseudo) R-square  0.7621 
Notes: * = significant at the 10% level. Marginal effect measured at the mean 
levels of the determinant variables. 
Source: authors’ farmer survey 2004 
 
 
5.3 Supermarket Channel Participation and the Farmer’s Production Technology 
 
In this section we want to compare the production technologies used by supermarket-channel 
farmers and traditional-channel farmers. In the micro-economic theory of the firm, technology 
is represented by a production function which reflects the technological relation that exists 
between any particular combination of inputs and the resulting levels of outputs q (Sadoulet 
and de Janvry 1995). These inputs consist of an X vector of variable inputs (e.g., fertilizer) 
and a Z vector of quasi-fixed inputs (e.g., land). Various types of production functions exist. 
Here we select the Cobb-Douglas production function which is the most used functional form 
for the analysis of farm efficiency (Battese, 1992; Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro, 1993). This 
production function takes on the following form:  
 




Where α and β represent the elasticity of production for the inputs with respect to the output, i.e., 
the percentage change in output for a 1% change in the input keeping all other inputs fixed 
(∂q*x/∂x*q, ∂q*z/∂z*q). By selecting land, labor and fertilizer as the inputs and taking the natural 




Supermarket-channel farmers: lnoutput = A1 + α1*lnlabor + β1*lnland + γ1*lnfertil + e1 (1) 
 
Traditional-channel farmers:   lnoutput = A2 + α2*lnlabor + β2*lnland + γ2*lnfertil + e2 (2) 
 
Whereby lnoutput is defined as the natural log of output measured as kg of kale produced by the 
farmer from the current acreage over 1 cycle; lnlabor is the natural log of the number of full 
work-days used for land preparation, planting and weeding of kale; lnland is the natural log of 
the number of acre-months used for kale growing (we want to take into account a harvest cycle 
length which over the sample varies from 2 to 12 months
12); and lnfertil is the natural log of the 
number of kg of fertilizer applied to the current acreage over 1 cycle (summarized over the 
various types of fertilizer which in terms of value per kg do not differ widely). The last term, e, is 




A method often used in econometrics to test for differences in regression functions across groups 
is the Chow test (Wooldridge 2000). The Chow statistic tests the null hypothesis that the 
intercept and all the coefficients are the same across the groups. For equations (1)  
and (2) above we get: 
 
H0: A1=A2, α1= α2, β1= β2, γ1= γ2 
 
The Chow test involves estimating a restricted model (the four restrictions under H0) and an 
unrestricted model (under the alternative hypothesis that H0 does not hold). The following F 
statistic must be calculated: 
 
Fk+1, n-2k-2 = [(SSRr – SSR1 - SSR2)/(SSR1+SSR2)] . [(n-2k-2)/(k+1)], 
 
where (i) SSR are the sum of squared residuals obtained (through ordinary least squares 
estimation) for the restricted model (using all observations) and for two separate regressions, one 
for each group (using only the observations for one group at a time), (ii) k is the number of 
coefficients to be estimated and (iii) n is the overall number of observations. The value of the F-
statistic here is 1.891 with a corresponding p-value of 0.129. This means we can reject H0 at the 
15% level. The test indicates that there is a statistically significant difference (at the 15% level) 
between the production functions of supermarket-channel farmers and traditional-channel 
farmers.  
 
Estimation of the Production Functions Corrected for Self-Selection Bias 
 
The distribution of the farmers over the two groups (supermarket channel, traditional channel) is 
not random but rather the outcome of a self-selection process. In order to control for this 
(potential) selectivity bias, we use Heckit’s two-stage method. In the first step, this method 
calculates the inverse Mill’s ratio (λ) for each observation (via a probit model for channel choice) 
                                                 
12 Kale leafs can be harvested from the same plants at regular intervals over periods stretching up to 12 months, 
although the normal harvest cycle is about three months (East Africa Seed Co. 2002).  
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which then in the second step is added in to the substantial model (the production function) as a 
control variable. The models now become: 
 
Supermarket-channel farmers: 
lnoutput = A1 + α1*lnlabor + β1*lnland + γ1*lnfertil + δ1*λ + e1  (3) 
 
Traditional-channel farmers:   
lnoutput = A2 + α2*lnlabor + β2*lnland + γ2*lnfertil + δ2*λ + e2  (4) 
 
Table 6 lists the estimated parameters for both models. The λ regressor is significant for equation 
4 which means its presence corrects for a self-selection bias. We further find that both models 
are significant and that the signs of the coefficients are as expected, namely output increases as, 
ceteris paribus, more land or more fertilizer are used. Labor was found not to have a statistically 
significant effect in either model. 
 
Table 6: Heckit Two-Stage Estimates of the Cobb-Douglas Production Functions 
Dependent variable: lnoutput  Supermarket farmers  Traditional market farmers 
Independent variables  Coefficient  (s.e.)  Coefficient (s.e.) 
Constant  6.8237 (1.1484)***  6.6034 (0.8699)*** 
Lnland  0.8681 (0.3133)***  0.5794 (0.2453)** 
Lnlabor  -0.3254 (0.2527)  0.0446 (0.2388) 
Lnfertil 0.2407  (0.1070)** 0.2030  (0.1553) 
Mill’s lambda  0.1952 (0.2471) 0.9889  (0.5379)** 
Wald Chi
2   107.3  28.25 
Significance 0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: ** = significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
Source: authors’ farmer survey 2004. 
 
Table 7 compares the marginal product values for the significant coefficients of table 6. The 
marginal product value is calculated by multiplying the marginal productivity of a factor xi 
(∂q/∂xi=α * q /xi) with the market price of the output. Several observations can be made. First, the 
data indicate that the marginal product value (MPV) differs greatly between the two groups of 
farmers: in absolute terms the MPV is larger for the well-capitalized supermarket-channel 
farmers while as a relative measure (relative to gross revenue) it is larger for the traditional-
channel farmers who capture only a small percentage of the marketing margin. Where one 
additional acre-month of land would increase revenue from the sale of kale with Ksh3,217 for 
traditional-channel farmers (i.e., roughly 10% of their average total revenue per acre), it would 
increase revenues for supermarket-channel farmers with Ksh8,073 (i.e., roughly 5% of their 
average total revenue per acre). Second, each of calculated marginal product values is larger than 
the corresponding factor cost, indicating that these factors are used below the optimal quantity 
for both groups of farmers. For traditional-channel farmers, this may indicate that land access is 
constrained by a limited access to land (high population density). For supermarket-channel 
farmers, who on average only use 70% of their land, the bottleneck is more likely to be found in 
the limited access to capital for irrigation system expansion. Third, the average land productivity 
and the average labor productivity are respectively 59% and 73% higher for supermarket-channel 
farmers than for traditional-channel farmers. This results from the more capital intensive  
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production methods used by supermarket-channel farmers (more variable inputs like fertilizer or 
chemicals and more quasi-fixed inputs per unit of labor and per unit of land). Relative to daily 
wages (which are Ksh150/day and Ksh120/day for supermarket-channel and traditional-channel 
farmers respectively) average labor productivity is four times the wage rate for supermarket-
channel farmers and three times the wage rate for traditional-market farmers. This extends to the 
supermarket-led part of the FFV supply system, the findings of Carter and Wiebe (1990) that 
higher access to capital (in this case of the supermarket-channel farmers) impacts the agrarian 
structure and productivity in Kenya. 
 
Table 7: Input Use and Farm Efficiency 
  Supermarket farmers  Traditional farmers 
Input MPV    FC  MPV    FC 
Land (acre-months)  8,073Ksh  >  667Ksh  3,217Ksh  >  1,083Ksh 
Fertilizer (kg)  56Ksh  >  28Ksh       
Productivity Measures 
Labor productivity (average 
output value per work day)  605Ksh 349Ksh 
Land productivity (average 
output value per acre-month)  10,264Ksh 6,437Ksh 
Notes: marginal product value (MPV) valued at farm-gate price of Ksh3.6/kg. Factor costs (FC) 
are sub-sample averages. 
Source: authors’ farmer survey 2004. 
 
5.4 Net Income Effect of Supplying Supermarkets 
 
In this section we assess whether or not there is a positive net income effect for farmers if they 
supply kale to supermarkets rather than to traditional buyers. Table 8 provides a gross margin 
analysis for the two types of farmers. The top half in this table, which looks at production, allows 
for a straight forward comparison between supermarket-channel and traditional-channel farmers. 
However, the marketing part forced us to make a choice. The supply channel for supermarkets 
has a particular given structure, with all farmers taking their harvest directly to the supermarket. 
Traditional-channel farmers can however supply to brokers, wholesalers or retailers (other than 
supermarkets). Furthermore, either type of farmer may sell to a wider set of buyers at different 
links in the supply chain. For example, a supermarket-channel farmer may sell his highest quality 
grade to supermarkets and the lower grades to wholesalers. Or a traditional-channel farmer may 
sell to a broker at the farm for one harvest, but collaborate with other farmers to take the next 
week’s harvest to a wholesaler. However, in most cases, both types of farmers sell most, if not 
all, of their harvest to a single type of buyer. In table 8 we opted to compare the most extreme 
(but also most common) marketing choices, namely supermarket-channel farmers sell (nearly) 
100% of their kale to supermarkets (applies to 60% of the farmers) and traditional-channel 
farmers sell (nearly) 100% of their kale to a broker at the farm (applies to 46% of the farmers).   
Table 8 indicates that there are substantial differences between the two groups of farmers. 
On average, supermarket-channel farmers use about twice the amount of inputs (fertilizer, 
manure, chemicals) traditional retailers use, but pay less per unit as they buy larger volumes. 
Supermarket-channel farmers use less seed, but seed of a higher quality (traditional-channel 
farmers produce their own seed which is cheap and of lower quality). The variable production  
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costs incurred by supermarket-channel farmers further include the costs for tractor rental and 
energy to operate an irrigation system. Traditional-channel farmers use more labor per acre, 
mostly because there is an abundance of family labor relative to the small farm sizes. Wages for 
hired labor are higher in the supermarket channel than in the traditional channel. (Family labor 
was valued at the same rate as hired labor in table 8.) Given the higher input levels, yields per 
acre are higher for supermarket-channel farmers
13. 
When we translate these farm practices into the production cost per kg of kale, we see 
that there is almost no difference between the two groups of farmers, with both types of farmers 
producing kale at about 3.5Ksh/kg on average. From this comparable starting point at the 
production level, the two paths diverge. Traditional-channel farmers incur limited marketing 
costs (only harvesting and bagging), but also receive a low price from brokers at the farm-gate 
which allows them to break even at best. Supermarket-channel farmers on the other hand also 
incur transportation costs, but receive a price which is more than three times the farm-gate price, 
resulting in a gross profit of about 40%.  
Let us now return to the net income effect of supplying supermarkets. Before selling to 
supermarkets, most current supermarket-channel farmers already had the capacity to market their 
production to buyers in Nairobi. Selling to supermarkets, who buy larger volumes per delivery, 
lowers the farmer’s transaction costs (several farmers told us that the time spend in selling was 
reduced from a day to an hour) and pays them a higher price (about 10-20% higher), and thus has 
a strong positive net income effect for these farmers. For individual traditional-channel farmers, 
shifting from a broker at the gate to selling to supermarkets would not have a positive net income 
effect as the transportation costs would be prohibitively high (given the small volumes). Table 9 
indicates how the supply capacity differs between the two groups of farmers. When harvest cycle 
length and size of the farm area under kale are taken into account, supermarket-channel farmers 
can supply more than five times the volume of traditional-channel farmers. This large difference 
in supply capacity (and the fact that supermarket-channel farmers grow a wider variety of crops) 














                                                 
13 Yields per acre vary greatly because of differences in variety, harvest cycle length, soil quality, climate and farm 
practices, but are estimated at 6MT per acre on average (MoARD 2002) while yields up to 15MT per acre are 
possible (for comparison, kale yields in the US can go up to 18MT per acre; Oregon State University 2002). The 
relatively high yield found here for traditional-channel farmers may be due to the specific selection of our sample (a 
key kale production area for the Nairobi market) or to the farmer’s overestimation of the quantity harvested and/or 
underestimation of the area under kale.   
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Table 8: Gross Margin Analysis Kale Supermarket vs. Traditional-channel farmers 
Data are per acre    Farmers supplying 
100% to supermarkets 
Kiambu farmers supplying 
100% to brokers at the farm 
Line Items















Seed **  Kg  0.4  1280  512  0.3  1.1  790  869  2.6 
Inorganic fertilizer  Kg  314  28.0  8,792  5.7  177  28.8  5,098  15.1 
Manure ***  MT  6.6  1,300  8,580  5.6  3.3  2,100  6,930  20.6 
Chemicals *  L  3.3  1,090  3,597  2.3  1.6  1,135  1,816  5.4 
Cost Irrigation (var.)   Month  5.4  2,200  11,880  7.7  0  na  0  0 
Tractor rental  Acre  1  2,000  2,000  1.3  0  na  0  0 
Total  inputs      35,361  23.0      14,713  43.7 
Labor by activity                 
Land preparation  Mds  17  150  2,550  1.7  28  120  3,360  10.0 
Planting Mds  12  150  1,800  1.2  19  120  2,280  6.8 
Weeding Mds  55  150  8,250  5.4  85  120  10,200  30.3 
Labor by Source                 
Family labor ***  Mds  8  150  1200  0.8  120  120  14400  42.8 
Hired labor ***  Mds  76  150  11400  7.4  12  120  1440  4.3 
Total Labor Cost  Mds  84  150  12,600  8.2  132  120  15,840  47.1 
Total Product. Cost  Kg  12,800  3.7  47,961  31.2  9,350  3.3  30,533  0.8 
Harvesting Mds  77  170  13,090  8.5  26  120  3,120  9.3 
Take & Sell Market  Mds  29  300  8,700  5.7  0  Na  0  0 
Rope (bag or bunch)  Pce  19,700  0.08  1,576  1.0  125  2  250  0.7 
Bags Bag  Na  Na  0  0  125  20  2,500  7.4 
Transport (var.)  Km  1,700  10  17,000  11.1  0  Na  0  0 
Phone Cost  Na  Na  Na  390  0.3  Na  Na  0  0 
Total Market. Cost  Kg  12,800  3.2  40,756  26.5  9,350  0.6  5,870  17.4 
Total Cost      6.9 88,717  57.8   3.9  36,423  108 
Total Revenue      12.0 153,600  100.0   3.6 33,660  100 
Gross Profit      5.1 64,883  42.2   -0.3  -2,763  -8.2 
Gross Profit (excl. 
family labor)      5.2 66,083  43.0   1.2  11,637  34.6 
Yield   12.8  MT/acre  9.4  MT/acre 
Notes: (1) significance for production line items: * = significant at the 10% level , ** = significant at the 5% 
level, *** significant at the 1% level; (2) numbers are indicative only as they are based on the farmer’s 
estimations, not direct measurement; (3) prices used are weighed sample averages for both groups of farmers; (4) 
weight conversions used: 1 bag=75kg, 1 bunch=0.65kg (authors’ field measurements). 











Table 9: Supply Capacity Supermarket vs. Traditional-channel farmers 





Yield 1 (MT/acre)  9.4  12.8  +37% 
Harvest Cycle Length (months)  5.1  4.4   
Yield 2 (kg/acre, month)  1,843  2,909  +59% 
Average Land Under Kale (acres)  0.9  3.6   
Supply Capacity (bunches/week)  415  2,600  +527% 
Source: authors’ farmer survey 2004. 
 
However, if traditional-channel farmers would join together to market their output, supplying to 
supermarkets would have a dramatic effect on their net income, as it would allow them to 
capture the 40% gross profit margin now enjoyed by the supermarket-channel farmers. Various 
factors hinder the emergence of marketing groups amongst traditional-channel farmers. First, 
there is a dire lack of experience with marketing produce (in fact, most farmers dislike to be 
engaged in marketing activities). Second, risk-averseness deters traditional-channel farmers from 
selling to more downstream buyers. On the one hand, selling to wholesalers exposes farmers to 
high price fluctuation risks which may average out for a broker supplying daily, but which could 
financially cripple a group of smallholders who could maybe market once a month. On the other 
hand, selling to supermarkets, which could provide more stable prices, implies that farmers have 
access to affordable credit and are willing to risk taking out a loan to invest in the irrigation 
system required by supermarkets. Furthermore, selling to supermarkets, who at times take up to a 
month to make payments, will often also exceed the working capital capacities of cash-strapped 
farmers.  
 
5.5 Supermarkets and Farmer Growth Dynamics 
 
Confirming the financial benefit of increased net income for farmers who can access the 
supermarket channel as indicated in the previous section, 93% of these farmers said that 
supplying to supermarkets has affected their profitability favorably. However, supermarkets also 
provide other benefits which are even more important to farmers than a higher price. While 34% 
of the supermarket-channel farmers say that the higher price is a key reason for selling to 
supermarkets, 46% say that the ease of selling to supermarkets is the key attraction. Consider a 
farmer in the traditional channel. Uninformed about the price of the day (maybe reacting to the 
previous day’s price), the farmer decides to harvest (maybe because there was no longer time to 
postpone it or because of an urgent need for cash) and takes her or his produce to the rural 
market. Many farmers and few brokers may show up at this market, leading to plummeting 
prices, which the farmer has to accept, even if they are below production cost, as the opportunity 
cost of the kale is close to zero (animal feed). Even within a given day, prices can fluctuate 
strongly, making the marketing process much like a gamble. Now consider a supermarket-
channel farmer. Since supplies are made to order, the farmer is certain, before harvesting, that 
the sale will take place and at what price. Prices paid by supermarkets change step-wise, 
remaining constant over longer time intervals, a stability which is desired by both the 
supermarket and the farmer. These orders are also coming in throughout the year with some 
reliability (at least for the growing group of FFV suppliers who get long term supply 
agreements). While supermarkets and their FFV suppliers start to build up long term  
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relationships, 95% of the traditional-channel farmers are selling in spot markets with buyers 
varying all the time. 
  The combination of higher net incomes and greater stability in volumes and prices in the 
supermarket channel, have created a strong growth dynamic. Of the farmers supplying kale to 
supermarkets, 75% said they increased production in response to supermarket demand. 
Supermarket-channel farmers have kept investing in their farm, resulting in a strong growth: the 
average farmed acreage of supermarket-channel farmers increased by 104% over 1999-2004, 
compared to by only 10% for traditional-channel farmers. In search for growth, the single most 
important input access constraint faced by supermarket and traditional-channel farmers alike is 
access to credit (Table 10). It is in this context meaningful that 44% of the supermarket-channel 
farmers believe that their status as a supplier to supermarkets (which gives them formal proof of 
a steady income flow) has increased their access to credit. However, increased access to credit 
does not necessarily mean affordable credit. Commercial credit is expensive (15-20% interest 
rate), while government supported loans (10% interest rate) are, according to the farmers, too 
difficult to obtain because of slow and selective bureaucratic procedures. This probably explains 
why even for supermarket-channel farmers access to credit remains a key constraint. 
Nevertheless, growing as they are, the current list of supermarket-channel farmers are likely to 
be able to follow growing demand for FFV by supermarkets for the next five years: 71% of these 
farmers state that, should supermarkets ask them to, they could double their current supply of 
kale within one (five month) cycle (92% of them by increasing production, 8% by sourcing from 
other farmers). 
 
Table 10: Farmers’ Access Constraints to Key Inputs 
% of farmers indicating that:  Traditional Farmers  Supermarket Farmers 
access to credit is a problem  88%  85% 
access to inputs is a problem  43%  16% 
access to land is a problem  8%  19% 
access to labor is a problem  3%  8% 
Source: authors’ farmer survey 2003. 
 
 
6. Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Our research has shown that the rise of supermarkets has given rise to a new group of farmers in 
the domestic FFV market. The key suppliers of FFV to supermarkets are mostly recently 
established, medium-sized farms (10-40 acres) managed by well-educated farmers and 
specialized in supplying supermarkets. Around 40% of supermarket-channel farmers fell in this 
category in 2004 and it is expected that these farmers will become dominant in the supplier base 
over the next five years. In terms of their capital, supermarket-channel farmers differ starkly 
from traditional-channel farmers. Especially size and the presence of an irrigation system were 
found to be critical determinants of participation in the supermarket channel. This is so because it 
addresses the current FFV procurement priorities for supermarkets in Kenya: finding farmers 
who can supply large volumes year-round. The fact that nearly all supermarket-channel farmers 
have the capacity to supply large volumes, have one or more transportation vehicles, an irrigation 
system, a packing shed, a cellular phone, and so on, points to the presence of a threshold capital 
vector which farmers must have in order to enter the supermarket channel. Only 25% of the  
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farmers supplying supermarkets directly can be classified as smallholders (less than 10 acres) 
and while we gave several examples of groups of smallholders who, assisted by market 
facilitators, are linked into the supermarket channel, the importance of such smallholder groups 
as direct suppliers of FFV to supermarkets is minimal. We further found that amongst kale 
suppliers to supermarkets, women are less frequently the head of the farm (1/6 in stead of 1/3 of 
the farms as is the case for traditional-channel farmers) and make up a smaller percentage of the 
employed workforce (a third in stead of half). 
Farms supplying kale to supermarkets have adopted capital intensive technologies. They 
use more quasi-fixed capital (e.g., irrigation systems) and apply (per acre) twice the amount of 
fertilizer, manure and chemicals used by traditional-channel farmers outside the supermarket 
channel. Consequently, average land and labor productivity are about 60-70% higher for 
supermarket farms. Although supermarket-channel farmers include few smallholder producers 
(relative to the traditional channel) and have a lower labor-to-land ratio, they employ many hired 
workers. On average there are 13 full-time workers per supermarket farm and 80% of these are 
hired laborers. The overall effect on labor is about a 20% reduction per acre. Furthermore, 
commensurate with their higher productivity, these hired farmed workers are paid a 15% higher 
wage on average. Our analysis further shows that, for kale, overall productivity of supermarket-
channel farmers and traditional-channel farmers is similar as both have nearly the same 
production cost per kg of kale. Therefore, on the production side, the essential limitation of 
traditional producers (85% of which are smallholders) is not their production efficiency but their 
lack of scale and inability to produce year round (in the absence of modern irrigation systems). 
An even more important difference between supermarket-channel farmers and traditional-
channel farmers is their marketing capacity. Most (individual) traditional-channel farmers do not 
have their own (motorized) transportation and lack the scale to rent it. Therefore these farmers 
are forced to sell to brokers who come to the farms at prices that allow them to break even at 
best. On the other hand, many supermarket-channel farmers were already supplying their 
produce to wholesalers or retailers in Nairobi and could easily make the switch to supplying 
supermarkets. The 10-20% higher prices paid by supermarkets (relative to wholesalers) give 
supermarket-channel farmers a healthy gross profit margin of 40% (for kale). 
If smallholder farmers could achieve the same transportation efficiency as supermarket-
channel farmers (by marketing in groups) and could supply direct to supermarkets, they would 
get three times the price they currently get from brokers at the farm, capturing the same 40% 
gross profits currently enjoyed by the supermarket-channel farmers. Furthermore, supermarket-
channel farmers indicated that the benefits of market risk reduction (more stable prices and 
volumes) and reduced transaction costs are even more important than the higher price. The 
combination of higher gross profits and a stable long term trading relationship has been a 
powerful determinant of a strong growth dynamic amongst supermarket-channel farmers. The 
latter have, on average over the last five years, doubled the size of their operations (where the 
traditional-channel farmers in this study only increased theirs with 10%). This strong growth 
further indicates that the current supermarket-channel farmers will likely keep pace with the 
growth of supermarkets and even increase their share of the supermarkets’ FFV supplies. 
 
Development Policy and Program Recommendations 
 
For development policies and programs, the key insight revealed by studies on the rise of 
supermarkets in developing countries (like this one), is that supermarkets are changing the  
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structure of the food system whether directly through their actions or through the competitive 
response they provoke in the traditional system, and that they are doing so fast. Those (farmers) 
who adapt (fast) will benefit from this change. Therefore, if we want to help smallholders in this 
new context, whether by helping them to link up with supermarkets or by making traditional 
channels more competitive, a similar set of recommendations can be put forward. The following 
three recommendations will help the design of development programs in taking the new reality 
of retailer driven food systems in developing countries into account. 
First, assistance programs must focus on complete supply chains, not individual agents, 
not parts of a chain. It is not enough to merely start from the market. There is a need to design 
the whole chain from the beginning. As we have shown in this paper, farmers need to meet a 
vector of criteria in order to gain access to supermarkets which cannot be addressed by assistance 
programs targeting an isolated problem in a particular industry (horizontal level), such as 
developing a higher yielding variety for farmers independent of other considerations regarding 
the structure of the supply chain. Essentially, this implies multiple partners to be involved in the 
development program, especially retailers. The design of the supply chains may further imply the 
creation of new market facilitators (e.g., outgrower schemes), which in turns raises the need to 
carefully look at potential agency problems in the design (are the stakeholders, more specifically 
the smallholder farmers, in control and benefiting?). 
Second, scale increase is needed throughout the chain. At the heart of the dynamics 
created by supermarkets chains is an increase in scale, first at the retail level, but then throughout 
the chain. Scale facilitates investment as well as the use of risk reducing institutions such as 
contracts, standards and grades, and so on. This implies group formation at the farmer level 
(investment capital, harvest schedules, volume), but also (simultaneously) group formation at the 
wholesaler and retailer level (e.g., a new type of smaller ‘farmer markets’ that can be located 
near residential areas and which share a FFV procurement system). The size of group formation 
is determined by the economies of size associated with transportation vehicles and irrigation 
systems as well as by the volume requirements of the supermarkets (or other larger-scale buyers 
of FFV). 
  Third, one of the most critical challenges in any program designed to help smallholder 
farmers in accessing modern supply chains is how to assist them in dealing with the inherent 
higher working capital requirements. Smallholder growers are very sensitive to working capital 
and cash flow issues as indicated by the frequently reported break-down of contractual 
relationships between farmers and buyers because of the former (either in temptation or in need) 
selling to brokers for cash (e.g., Jaffee and Morton 1995). Therefore there is a strong need to 
develop and integrate creative solutions that help keep working capital (and cash-outflows) down 
for farmers. The following are some examples in this context: blended fertilizer, labor-driven 
pumps, factoring. One project in Western Kenya involving 25 farmers has developed a fertilizer 
which is blended specifically for a particular application in a particular area (based on a soil 
analysis) and is marketing the fertilizer in small affordable bags (Okwemba 2004). Initial results 
indicate yields that are 200% higher, which implies, inversely, that cash-strapped farmers could 
reduce their expenditure on fertilizer without loss of yield. Kenya’s MoneyMaker pumps, 
recently heralded as one of ‘Ten Inventions That Will Change the World’ by Newsweek 
magazine (Stone 2003), provide a labor-intensive solution to the required irrigation system. The 
pumps are (relatively) low cost in purchase ($60) and in operation (using the labor of a worker 
pedaling the pumps’ pistons). Factoring, in Kenya pioneered by the Kenya Gatsby Trust (an 
NGO), is a financial tool that could greatly help farmers in dealing with the payment terms of  
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supermarkets. Factoring entails buying out (at a fee) the buyer’s payment obligation to the 
supplier after delivery took place. For example, a farmer supplies Ksh5,000 worth of FFV to the 
supermarket and receives an immediate payment of Ksh4,800 payment from the factoring agent, 
rather than waiting 30 days for the payment to come from the actual buyer. Factoring could be 
worked out more systematically in order to take away the farmer’s temptation of defaulting on a 
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